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Controversies always seem to swirl about the death penalty. Some challenges, such as 
~ecuring a supply of the lethal agent, seem like fallen leaves blown by today's passing 
r~eze. Depending on the day's news and editorial slant, each new brutal crime or last 
lll!nute legal escape from death row shifts public opinion-haphazardly it sometimes 
seems, to those of us trying to keep our bearings. 
d" The first decade of the 21st century saw the Supreme Court declare death as grossly 
l~sproportionate for whole classes of people-the mentally retarded, murderers under 
f, ' those who raped adults, or even children-but left their victims living. Several states 
tlllally or effectively abolisped the death penalty for those categories, and the U.S. 
h Upreme Court used the consistent direction of change to hold that standards of decency 
tad constitutionally evolved to the point of rejection. The last decade has witnessed several 
: .ate legislatures abolishing the death penalty entirely. Armed with Supreme Court ju-
~spr~dence, abolitionists set their strategy for the second decade of the 21st century: 
G?nvmce the Court to use its new metric to alter the reach of the Eighth Amendment. 
a '~e the Court grounds to declare that the consistent direction of change-abolition-
i ~ the degree of change across several states has crossed a threshold where death as pun-
; lll~nt now violates the Eighth Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court set abolitionists 
~ t~ls strategic course a half century ago in Trap v. Dulles (1958), basing the content of 
st e Eighth Amendment on the capacity of a "maturing" society to discern its own "evolving 
andards of decency" (p. 101, plurality opinion) . 
So ~onically, even as their strategy shifts this next decade to convince the court that American 
th Ciety has morally rejected the cfeath penalty, abolitionists have given up trying to convince 
ane_Arnerican people to reject the death penalty on moral grounds. Mistake-executing 
h lllnocent person; cost, class and race bias-these were the points of attack. Abolitionists 
t:~ largely conceded and do not want to engage the public on whether anybody deserves 
ali le. In fact many concede that most essential moral point. Others recognize they will 
enate the vast majority of the population who feels certain death is sometimes deserved.1 
er 1?is last half century or so, immediately before and during the death penalty's modern 
U!a, .m a society deeply split over how to punish murder, and with a Supreme Court reg-
fu a~lllg the death penalty's every aspect, changes in capital jurisprudence appear fast and 
U:~ous. These past SO years, while America's experiment with the death penalty has been 
off, er s~stained attack, it seems as though we are in the midst of one of those rare periods 
evensh activity and perhaps a radical paradigm shift into a new way of thinking. -----1. Cf. K. Scheidegger (2013) discussing the abolitionist 2012 strategy for California's repeal. 
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h · · fthis But square that distance, and step back 2500 years or more, to trace t e ongms 0 d 
Great Debate, when the first five books of the Old Testament were finally assembled, an 
genius flowered in ancient Greece. Trace the death penalty controversy in the U.S. today 
from its branches to its main limbs, down the trunk and underground to ancient ro?ts 
in common soil from which Western culture has been generating, and discover taking 
the long view, that homicide substance and procedure remain the most conserva~ve aspe~ 
of law in Western culture. "A man's character is his fate;' Heraclitus declared m the 6 
century B.C., with one of his slippery claims that still tantalizes us. A jury deliber~tes 
whether a convicted killer lives or dies: Was his homicidal act aberrant-was it essentiallY 
in or out of character? Mosdy he will do what has been done to him; must we do to hiJ11 
as he has done? Who has he become and what will become of him? The jury's assessment 
of the defendant's character determines his fate. It's a strange tree, this death penalty· 
Today, from all sides, states are pressed either to reform the death penalty or reject It, 
mend it or end it-and soon. Whether we end up limiting the punishment of death ap-
propriately or eliminating it entirely seems far from setded. Meanwhile, sampling th~ 
soil-examining and interpreting some of the main roots of Western culture-the Ol f 
Testament and ancient Greece2-even cursorily and eccentrically in the dappled light 0 
today's debate, would seem to nourish both past and present. And if it cannot enable us 
to predict precisely our future shape, it may at least help guide us in pruning well to grow 
better. 
The Good Book 
"In the Beginning . . :' 
The first sin-or crime (in the Beginning there was no distinction)-was capital. 'J'~e 
Sovereign had warned Adam not to eat the apple lest he "surely die on that day" (GenesiS 
III:3). Found guilty, Adam and Eve were condemned to hard labor and permanentlY 
denied access to immortality. Adam would toil the fields, Eve would suffer in childbir.th 
and perpetual subordination. And someday, both would die. By the time they did di~f 
however, hundreds of years later, it seemed as if their original sin had been forgotten, .1 
not forgiven. With long procedural delays, while the condemned live out their lives Ill 
prison, it still seems that way today. 
What took the Sovereign so long to execute this first death sentence? 
Perhaps on reflection, God accepted some responsibility for the conditions that 
produced the capital crime, having placed the tree smack in the middle of the garden 
and making it tempting; Arguably, too, Adam and Eve were induced, perhaps en trappe~ 
by the serpent, the Lords own agent. They each had raised a defense of sorts: Confronte 
by the Accuser, Adam instandy flipped the script, implicating Eve_ "the woman thoU 
2. ~~ough I have. attempted here to map t~e Ancients onto today's death penalty debate,. I a: 
not a B1bli~al ?r ClaSSical sc~olar, ~nd have. rehed on others' translations, picking and cho?s!llg d 
se~ms eluc1datmg. ConversatiOns w1th Rabb1s Lee Friedlander, Philip Schechter, David Sperllll~, ~~al 
M1chael .stressfeld, and Professors Alyssa Gray and Murray Lichtenstein helped inform my ~1bh 
5 perspective. Our current death penalty, however, mostly drives this Biblical exegesis-easily, 1t tuf!'l 
out, because the Bible and Ancient Greek ph~osophy drive today's penalty. My challenge has. been td 
extract the values and less?ns from the ~c1ents neutrally, honestly, ~nd with balance, while I fe 
and know to a moral certamty that death 1s sometimes rightful punishment. 
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gavest to be with me, she gave it to me ... " (Genesis III:12). Eve pinned it on the snake. 
Still, both were condemned. 
Looking back, this first capital crime-theft and possessing contraband-arguably 
seems trivial and the punishment extreme, even vindictive. Perhaps being mortal was the 
cost of knowing the difference between Good and Evil. If so, death is a stiff price to pay 
for our change in character. We were expelled from the Garden to prevent access to the 
Tree of Life and have rebelled through medical science ever since. In any case, so long 
delayed, disproportionate, and with no deterrent effect, from the beginning the death 
Penalty seems to have failed miserably. 
<<1\ K 
J.VIOre Than I Can Bear .. :' 
When Cain killed his brother Abel, God not only spared but protected him. Abolitionists 
embrace this story: Just as God declined the death penalty, even for this intentional pre-
meditated killing, so too humankind, made in the image of God, should show mercy 
and spare intentional murderers. 
But why had Cain killed Abel? God had graciously accepted shepherd Abel's prized 
animal, but rejected farmer Cain's fruits. Cain must have felt humiliated and resentful 
toward his brother when God "did not respect Cain and his offering." Cain was "very 
angry" Scripture tells us, and depressed- "his countenance fell" -but he did not snap. 
lie and his brother had a conversation to which we are not privy. Thereafter, out in the 
field Cain "arose" and intentionally slew him. 
What was the nature of this killing? We cannot know for sure. Feeling "dissed" by God, 
Cain must have stewed on it. It may have been premeditated, but perhaps also provoked 
and passionate. We can imagine an anguished Cain crying as he killed Abel. What legal 
fate awaits a person today whose intentional3 killing was an outrageously unwarranted 
response to a.minor slight that hurt him deeply or, as in this case, a provocation from 
the action of another-namely God's rejection? Life, or death for Cain? In traditional 
common law such brooding would not mitigate murder, unless the deadly act was a 
SUdden reaction in the "heat of passion:' Today, however, many states permit the defendant's 
slow burn to mitigate the murder to manslaughter. Such a killing probably would not be 
capital-statutes often specifically exempt from the death penalty even an inadequately 
Provoked passion killing, although an aggressive prosecutor might characterize the homicide 
as cold blooded and try to convince a jury that Cain had lured Abel to the field in order 
to kill him. 
Looked at in this light, the story of Cain hardly stands for categorically rejecting capital 
PUnishment, even for premeditated murder. As the Hebrew text suggests, Cain did not 
murder" Abel; he "killed" him. God spared Cain because Cain was not the worst of the 
Worst. The real lesson from the story of Cain and Abel is that not all killers deserve to die. 
The incident can teach us more. Cain initially attempted to obstruct justice by answering 
evasively, if not outright lying to Authority: '~m I my brother's keeper?" He refused to 
~ooperate or confess, disavowing any responsibility to care for the brother he had just killed. 
What hath thou done?" an angry God demanded. "The voice of your brother's blood is crying 
to rne from the ground. And now you are cursed from the ground" (Genesis IV:10-11). ----~ Buber questions whether it was at all intentional: "Cain does not yet know what death and 
g are," he insists. "He does not murder, he has murdered" (Buber 1952:89). 
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The past counts. The earth does not belong only to the living. Bloodshed cries out to 
be avenged: Emotively, the blood of the dead victim compels us to act. 
God spared Cain, the killer, but sentenced him to life as a fugitive, rootless, to "wander 
forever." When rejecting the death penalty today, we confine intentional murderers for 
life, also removing them from hearth and home. 
It is "more than I can bear," protested Cain. A perpetual stranger in a strange land, be 
would always feel vulnerable to attack. When Cain cried out in agony, God comforted 
and protected him: "If any one slays Cain, vengeance shall be taken on him sevenfold. An~ 
the LORD put a mark on Cain, lest any who came upon him should kill him" (GenesiS 
IV:13-15). 
Cain's relief shows that he, and God believed that the threat of death, and sometimes 
only the threat of a ferocious kind of death- in this case "vengeance sevenfold"-could 
deter murder. Ironically then, the first murderer heard the first death penalty pronounced 
not as punishment for, but as protection from the consequences of his own conduct.
4 
As 
God protected Cain against lethal violence during his lifetime banishment, so today, even 
while they confine them, states seek to protect convicted murderers by specificallY 
threatening with death those who kill a fellow prisoner. 
When Cain spoke in his own defense at sentencing, he never protested lack of noti~e. 
Though his parents, Adam and Eve, had been warned that eating the fruit was a capital 
offense, the Lord never explicitly forbade killing. Eating from the tree in the middle of 
the garden became evil only because it was positively prohibited. But killing a brot~e.r 
from jealousy was malum in se-self-evidently and objectively wrong, and thus no explicit 
notice was necessary. Without protest then, the trial of Cain had relied on the unarticulate? 
natural law, the moral fact implicit in humanity, that murder is evil. The outcry of Abels 
blood was the proof; the earth's pollution its consequence. 
Today too, more than the killer's violation of previously announced law, the victirn:s 
lingering cry moves retributivist advocates of the death penalty. For them, deterrence ~s 
secondary. The story of Cain is less about a death penalty threatened for others, than It 
is about that punishment not visited upon him. 
As a lesser substitute punishment, even lifetime banishment for Cain was not to be 
unbearable. But the past does count. There must be a reckoning. Unless we heed the 
anguish of the victim and inflict deserved punishment, we too shall suffer and "be curs~d 
from the ground." From the beginning, however, at least with homicide, God seems dis~, 
criminating: Although he may have murdered Abel, Cain was not the "worst of the worst 
and thus did not deserve to die. 
God's Covenant with Noah: 
"By the Hand of Man .. ?' 
Things got worse. The "earth" generally was "corrupt" and "filled with violence:' Disgusted, 
and regretting the whole Creation, the Lord decided to "blot out" all life, except for Noah 
and his family and one pair of each living thing. After the Flood, the Sovereign seems to 
have regretted this indiscriminate mass execution, and promises "never again" to repeat 
4. Dershowitz points to this, but offhandedly characterizes Cain as a "cold-blooded" murderer 
(Dershowitz 2000:204, 214). 
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it. Blessing them, God tells Noah and his family to "be fruitful and multiply, and fill the 
earth" (Genesis IX:?). 
b "I give you everything," God continues, in this purely life-affirming moment. But the 
lessing comes with restrictions. "For your lifeblood I will surely require a reckoning; of 
~very b~ast I will require it and of man; of every man's brother I will require the life of man" 
fGenes1s IX:S). This reckoning with the past will not be God's domain alone. Scripture 
(
amously continues: "He who sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed" 
Genesis IX:6). 
T~!s line from Genesis challenges Bible literalists who would be death penalty 
~ohtiOnist~. 5 Their best counter is to suggest that God's statement is merely a prediction: 
umans will retaliate for homicide. God does not command the death penalty, the 
~rgument goes. God embeds retaliation in human nature, to be expected with certainty . 
. c?olars say that although the original Hebrew text permits this future tense interpretation, 
It IS most strained in light of repeated unambiguous commands for the death penalty 
elsewhere in the Old Testament. Why would God in this passage alone merely predict 
What elsewhere is repeatedly mandated, and refined? 
"By the hand of man shall his blood be shed," Scripture commanded, ''for God made 
:an in his own image" (Genesis IX:6). When a human made in the image of God has 
f, een murdered, other humans acting in the image of God will execute the person responsible 
. or the lifeblood. "The guilt of the murderer is infinite because the murdered life is 
Invaluable" (Greenberg 1970:26). But the image of God is not God, suggesting a state of 
Perfection to which humans can only aspire, but never attain. 
be Unqualified, a command to humans to kill "whoever sheds the blood of rna?". wo~d 
grotesquely overbroad. Both Leviticus and Numbers refine that command and distmgwsh 
types of homicides, well beyond the example of Cain. But near the Beginning-destroying 
almost all life in the Flood and commanding Noah immediately afterwards-God appears 
to administer and ordain the death penalty without much concern for individual desert. 
A.t the other extreme, abolitionists today cling to "thou shalt not kill" as if God's great 
CQffimandment delivered to Moses from Sinai was a blanket prohibition covering the death 
pe~alty. But the Hebrew refutes this, scholars agree. "Thou shalt not murder:' it more literally 
~nJoins, and not "Thou shalt not kill.''6 Thus to insist that the death penalty itself is murder 
egs the question and butchers the text. Semantically, Scripture does not, and logically could 
not prohibit the death penalty, for which it calls throughout the Law. Abolitionists would 
do better to stop perverting this famous Commandment for rhetorical effect.7 
,,.,.., 
.to Slay the Righteous with the Wicked ... " 
"Be blameless and I will make my covenant between me and you," the Lord had instructed 
Abraham (Genesis XVII:2). The implication was clear: The righteous would prosper; and ----G S .. some Christian fundamentalists deny that non-Jews are bound by Mosaic law, thus making enesis uniquely significant. 
6· A categorical note accompanies the Oxford Bible translation, "you shall not kill": "This com-
llla~dment forbids murder (see Gen. IX:S) not the forms of killing authorized, . .. e.g. war or capital 
Punishment." 
sh 7· Wor~e:, when abolitionists divert the Commandment fr~m the killer to society br~a~y'. "Thou 
4Dalt not kill has no chance to stand emphatically for what It should: To each person mdiVIdually, 
th 0. not commit murder!" And to the People, the Community derivatively, "Do not knowingly execute 
e IIlnocent or those who do not deserve to die." 
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the wicked would be struck down. "Wilt thou indeed destroy the righteous with the wicked?" 
(Genesis XVIII:23) Abraham later challenged God, who was about to obliterate Sodom 
with all its inhabitants. "Will you destroy the innocent with the guilty?" (Genesis, XVIII:23) 
Abraham protests in another translation. But today, the "guilty" are not always "wicked;'s 
nor are the "innocent" always "righteous." In contemporary bifurcated death penalty trials, 
the fact-finder first determines legal guilt or innocence. Then, during the "penalty phase:' 
the focus shifts from factual guilt to the moral plane of desert. No longer "did s/he do 
it?" -the separate question now becomes "does s/he deserve to die for it?" 
Jesus' challenge to those who would execute the prostitute- "Let him who is without 
sin cast the first stone"- implies not that she is innocent, but either that there are no 
righteous people or that every righteous person is guilty of something. Today, many street 
criminals stand convicted of crimes they did not commit. But because they committed 
so many other crimes for which they were never apprehended,9 there is a prison saying: 
"Maybe you serve time not for what you've done all the time, but all the time you serve, 
you serve for what you've done" (Blecker 1990: 1166). The scales of justice balance out 
for the unrighteous-but-legally-innocent. In the furor over capital punishment today, as 
evidence mounts that "innocent" people are being released from death rows, the public 
officially concentrates on "legal" innocence, but more easily tolerates individual "legal 
error" as long as the mistake attaches to criminals already seen as unrighteous. 10 
"Far be it from thee to do such a thing, to slay the righteous with the wicked," Abraham's 
challenge continues, "so that the righteous fare as the wicked" (Genesis XVIII:25). Far 
wrong, indeed, to execute the innocent in order to slay the deserving. God is presumed 
to stay clear from working such injustice. And today we go to great lengths to ensure that 
the innocent shall not be put to death. But it tears at us when righteous victims suffer 
while their wicked killers thrive. Retributivists need to exact punishment so the wicked, 
too, shall suffer along with their righteous victims. Nor can retributivists tolerate sheer 
arbitrariness, where the wicked and righteous seem to be punished indifferently. 
Abraham gets God to promise to spare Sodom if fifty righteous persons can be found 
dwelling within. Then Abraham has the guts to lead God down the slippery slope. Suppose 
there are forty-five, forty, thirty, twenty ... ? Abraham bargains God down one last time 
and then he quits. And God concedes: "For the sake of ten I shall not destroy it" (Genesis 
XVIII:22-32). 
Abraham's challenge to the Judge of Judges is justly celebrated as brave: Defense counsel 
acting on behalf of others (Adam, Eve, and Cain had all defended themselves)- denying 
the Supreme Authority's moral right to risk executing the innocent. God and man must 
spare many guilty persons who deserve to die rather than execute the innocent. Humans 
are, after all, made "in the image of God." 
8. Exodus XXIII:? commands: "The guiltless and the righteous slay thou not." From this dual mention, 
the rabbis inferred that in capital cases, after the defendant had been condemned, a witness might 
step forward with exculpatory evidence and force a retrial, lest the guiltless be slain. An acquittal. 
however, was final . Because, the rabbis reasoned, the accused had been found righteous, and newly 
discovered evidence against him might establish only that this righteous defendant was not innocent 
(Babylonian Talmud Sanhedrinl935:33b). 
9. "Though he had not smitten him yet-he was termed a wicked man" (Babylonian Talmud 
Sanhedrin 1935:54b). 
10. When I witnessed the execution of Benny Demps in Florida, I knew the evidence left some 
doubt about whether Demps had in fact murdered a fellow prisoner for which he was ostensibly being 
put to death. But years earlier, Demps brutally murdered two others. He only escaped execution when 
the Supreme Court emptied death rows across the U.S. in Furman v. Georgia (1972), a completelY 
unrelated case (cf. Blecker, 2013). 
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S But Abraham had stopped at ten. He did not suggest that God spare all the wicked of 
o~om for the sake of a single righteous soul, at least one of whom-Lot-he knew 
resided there. In the end, Lot's sons-in-law thought Lot was jesting when he warned them 
to flee; they, although not wicked, died along with the rest of Sodom and Gomorrah. It 
seems by destroying whole cities as punishment, the Judge of all Earth risked killing . 
P~so~s who did not deserve to die for the certainty of killing larger numbers of guilty 
w .0 d1d. The lesson here-justice systems have limits. We must greatly favor sparing the 
rulty lest we execute the innocent. But there are limits: Some error is inevitable and un-
ortunately must be tolerated.l1 
When Lot and his family fled, God commanded them not to look back. Lot's wife 
almost instinctively stared at the rightful destruction of the wicked- and was instantly 
tu.rned into a pillar of salt. Does this passage warn that the public generally should not 
Witness death sentences carried out? Lot's family were innocents who happened to dwell 
~rnong the wicked. There was no need to witness this mass destruction, done neither in 
t eir name nor as an object lesson for them. 
al On several occasions in the Old Testament God will punish entire populations, innocents 
ong with the guilty. But humans, although made in the image of God, are not God and 
~ust not slay the righteous indiscriminately with the wicked. Human life is special. Unlike 
. ~tJ:er contemporary Near Eastern cultures12 (Greenberg 1970:29-30), the Bible embraces 
Individual culpability, rejecting collective or vicarious punishment: "Parents shall not be 
P~t to death for children, nor children for parents; each shall be put to death for his own 
crzrn " D th I h · h · th e,. euteronomy XXN:l6 famously declares. And lest ey say t eng teous With 
ch e WI~,ked, humans are to uphold a presumption of innocence .. "Keep far from ~false 
arge, God commands in Exodus XXIII:?, "and do not slay the mnocent, for I wtll not 
:~quit the .w!cked." God guarantees it: Although acquitted by human judgment, the wicked 
all be dlVlnely punished. 13 
In today's secular society whose Constitution guarantees the separation of church and 
state, many citizens are skeptical that punishment somewhere else necessarily follows 
. Otherwise unpunished crime in this world. Government must overcome our natural re-
~n~ment that wicked persons walk free and prosper. The People demand justice from 
. eir government in this world. We must rest our commitment to a presumption of 
~nnocence on a satisfaction that comes from believing that the righteous, although they 
ave acted wickedly, will not die at the hands of the State. How better to "keep far" from 
~false charge, and thus "not slay the innocent and righteous:' than to indulge all real 
oubts for a defendant's benefit? 
''Yi ou Shall Inquire Diligently ... and If 
It Be True and Certain" 
"If there is found among you .. . a man or woman who has done evil ... and it is told to 
You and you hear of it then you shall inquire diligently, and if it is true and certain that such 
----II. Dershowitz (2000:86-89) independently makes the same point. 
l2. For example, according to the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi (Plato 1978:209- 210), "if a 
lllan strike a [pregnant] woman" and caused her to die, his daughter was to be put to death. 
h 13· The Old Testament does not explicitly mention an afterlife, but Divine Justice outside the 
Urnan sphere is clearly implied. 
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an abominable thing has been done .. . you shall stone that man or woman to death" (Deuteron-
omy XVII:2-5). 
No subtle message here: We are obliged to investigate, prosecute, and punish with 
death the worst of all crimes. But prosecution and punishment demand diligent inquiry. 
Reports and rumors may not be true. There is a dual fervor here: The Bible commands 
us to punish the wicked, but only if it is true and certain that an abominable thing has 
been done. 
This demand was for factual certainty only-and what else could be required? For a 
people whose very meaning of "moral" was to strictly apply God's command, a moral 
certainty that a defendant deserved to die flowed automatically from a finding of factual 
guilt, with no prerogative to commute the sentence. In Biblical days, eyewitness testimonY 
was probably the most reliable of all evidence. Yet even the testimony of a witness of 
sound mind with no motive to lie, who swore to being absolutely certain that the defendant 
committed the capital crime, was not enough to sentence a person to die, even if 
corroborated by circumstantial evidence. 
"Presumption of innocence;' and "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" are modern terms 
with ancient roots: "Keep far" from a false charge, and only after "diligent inquiry" demon-
strates the fact as "true and certain" shall the defendant be put to death; and even then, 
only if two witnesses swear to the same events. This ancient imperative, "super due 
process;' is as pulsing as the demand for punishment: ''And you shall stone that man or 
woman to death. On the evidence of two witnesses or of three witnesses he that is to die shall 
be put to death; a person shall not be put to death on the evidence of one witness" (DeuteronomY 
XVII:S-7). 
"Then You Shall Do to Him As He Had 
Meant to Do .. :' 
What if witnesses were lying? Suppose two people conspired to have the defendant 
wrongly executed by the State? "If a malicious witness rises against any man to accuse him 
of wrongdoing, then both parties to the dispute shall appear before the ... judges [who} shall 
inquire diligently, and if the witness is a false witness and has accused his brother falsely, therl 
you shall do to him as he had meant to do to his brother so you shall purge the evil from the 
midst vf you. And the rest shall hear, and fear, and shall never again commit any such evil 
among you" (Deuteronomy XIX:16-19). 
Like kind punishment: We do to the false witness what he would have had done to the 
innocent defendant. This ancient retributive measure feels right; it is poetically just, ret-
ributively just, emotionally just. By it we restore a balance and satisfy the retributive 
impulse to purge, or to "put away the evil." We gratify a deeply felt need rooted in the 
past. Then Scripture immediately returns attention to the living and the future: ''And 
those that remain shall hear and fear and never again commit ... " (Deuteronomy XIX:20). 
Punishment then becomes forward-looking, its purpose to prevent other people froi1l 
committing similar crimes. But deterrence, more frequently found throughout the text, 
is ultimately peripheral. The need to restore the balance, to strike down the one who 
destroyed the life force, drives the Biblical death penalty (Bailey 1987:37). 
Retribution and deterrence, thus paired in the Old Testament, are still coupled today. 
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that in order to be constitutional, 
the death penalty must serve either a retributive or a deterrent purpose (Coker v. Georgia 
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197~; Enmund v. Florida 1982; Lockett v. Ohio 1978; Tison v. Arizona 1987). Capital 
Punishment may never rest solely on convenience or its efficiency in incapacitating those 
we catch. The individual must deserve it uniquely, and/or others must change as a result. 
M Scripture seems to make this same point: "Purge the evil" and "the rest shall hear." 
It Uch more often than it justifies punishment, the Old Testament explains its purpose: 
k sp~aks principally in terms of deterrence, focusing on the good punishment will do in 
eepmg the congregation law-abiding. 
[; I Bowever, independent of deterrence, a witness who would send a man to his death 
ta sehly, deserved to die: "Your eye shall not pity; it shall be life for life, eye for eye, tooth for oot " ( i d' · · ·. Deuteronomy XIX:21) . Scripture here demands attitude: It exudes righteous 
n Ignatron that one person would lie and scheme to use the community's justice process 
has a m~rder weapon. Inflict like-kind punishment; let him experience what he would ave his · · · . VICtim expenence. Show no pity. 
fl ~nly a hardened heart can be emotionally distanced enough to rightly punish this de-
(~~ ant. As Adam Smith explored brilliantly 250 years ago in his Theory of Moral Sentiments 
v· ~9 ), we can have no pity for the defendant only if we have complete sympathy for the 
I~un. If the victim is dead, we can remember, imagine, and stay angry at his suffering 
an tragic end. 
l'h~at i~ the _pe_rjurer'~ scheme is detected before a~ innocent _person is put to death? 
putative vrctrm, relieved to be alive, and recogmzed as an mnocent person nearly 
~Jcecuted unjustly, might want to put the incident to rest. The crime may seem less heinous 
s ecause no one died. But, as measured by his intent, the deserts of the perjurer are the 
am:. What would be gross injustice to an innocent person becomes appropriate 
~unish~ent for the guilty-homeopathically giving him a taste of his own medicine. 
h.
0 t? him exactly what he would have had done. "Moral luck" -the good fortune that 
hIS VIctim escaped harm-counts for nothing here. The judges must imagine what would 
ave happened and punish the intent fully. 
b _The passage instructs that an attempt that fails or is nipped in the bud should sometimes 
~~g the death penalty. Thus far, however, the states and federal governments have rejected 
w~s. Many urged the death penalty for Richard Reid, the AI Qaeda trained "shoe bomber" 
p 0 Would have blown up a plane full of people but for the timely restraint of alert 
hiassengers and crew, moments before the bomb was to have gone off. "You shall do to 
m as he had meant to do." The U.S. Supreme Court, however, seems to hold the death 
Penalty disproportionately "cruel and unusual" for attempted murder where nobody died. 
fr But whether or not the scheme succeeds, Scripture demands that judges keep outrage 
6 esh and cut off all sympathy. And witnesses, both lying and truthful, assume responsibility 
or ~he executions their testimony produced. Thus, "the hand of the witnesses shall be first 
;r·llns~ him to put him to death, and afterward the hand of all the people. So you shall purge 
p e ~v!l from the midst of you" (Deuteronomy XIX:18-19). The whole community 
/~hCipates in the punishment, with the witnesses casting the first stones. Today the 
P
itize?ry participates by sending representatives to witness the execution. If contemporary 
ractrc · th · · d e were to preserve the spirit of Scripture, perhaps JUrors, e sentencmg JU ge, 
:d/or the prosecutor would more actively participate, at least by witnessing the execution 
ey had partly produced. 
t Biblical commands foreshadow today's "super due process" before we condemn a person 
k:u~eath . States have long since discarded the two-witness rule, but by making witness-
th Ing capital, legislatures do attempt to protect witnesses from others who would slay 
em to prevent their truthful testimony. On the other hand, the law inadequately protects 
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innocent defendants against lying snitches, or "jail house informants" as they are more 
politely called. These centuries we have nearly come full circle; commissions charged with 
reforming the death penalty recommend that the "two witness" requirement be restored, 
and executions be prohibited based solely on an informant's uncorroborated testimonY·
14 
At trial, of course "a State may not entrust the determination of whether a man should 
live or die to a tribunal organized to return a verdict of death" (Lowenfield v. Phelps 
1988:258, Marshall, J., dissenting, quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois 1968:521). What else 
does a special commitment to a presumption of innocence and super due process require 
in the context of capital cases? 
"You Shall Accept No Ransom .. !' 
From earliest times, the victim's family responded to homicide. They would retaliate 
if they could; blood feuds would develop, or the killer might flee. Or a "blood price" 
could be paid as a settlement, buying the killer peace and the victim's survivors some 
measure of satisfaction. It has stayed that way in the streets. 15 
All other pre-Biblical Near Eastern cultures allowed the victim's family or the communitY 
to settle up and be compensated for their loss16 (Greenberg 1970:26-27). Seemingly, 
moral guilt was irrelevant. The slayer was simply worth more alive, perhaps as a slave. 
(Or today as a lifer inside.) For utilitarians it has always been about costs and benefits. 
The blood price worked: No one complains, and anyway, "Don't cry over spilt blood"-
just put it behind you and move on. 
As defendant-friendly as the Bible was when it carne to proving capital murder, however, 
it did not allow murderers to live who deserved to die: "And these things shall be a statute 
and ordinance to you throughout your generations," declared the Lord, emphatically laying 
down the law: "The murderer shall be put to death . .. but no person shall be put to death 
on the testimony of one witness. 17 Moreover, you shall accept no ransom for the life of a 
murderer, who is guilty, but he shall be put to death" (Numbers :XXXV:29-31). 
The ancient Hebrews recognized that money can never truly compensate for murder, 
and they also embraced its moral corollary-that no property crime should be capital. 
Theft was one thing-but death was different. Successful prosecution for burglary brought 
double your money back. But murder brings only death. By refusing to allow the killer 
to buy his way out, the Old Testament taught that individual human life is incommensurablY 
valuable (Greenberg 1970:26-27). Human life has no price: No amount of money given 
could ever equal the value of an innocent life taken. Life was neither expressible nor dis-
chargeable in monetary terms, as humans are made in God's image. Justice shall not be 
bought; the victim's family shall not be bought off. 
"Accept no ransom," in lieu of the death penalty, "for blood pollutes the land, and no 
expiation can be made ... for the blood that is shed in it, except by the blood of him who shed 
it" (Numbers :XXXV:33). No longer were close relatives competent to decide what was 
14. See the Illinois Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment (2002). 
15. Today's no-fault insurance and civil negligence lawsuits also help settle the dispute. d 
16. Hittite Law provided: "Whoever commits murder, whatever the heir himself of the murdere , 
man says (will be done). If he says, 'Let him die; he shall die, but if he says 'Let him make compensation. 
he shall make compensation. The King shall have no role" (Roth 1997:225). 
17. Defense attorney Martin McClain insisted in a class we previously co-taught that New Y?rlc 
prosecutors traditionally excluded Orthodox Jews as jurors because of their commitment to this biblical 
requirement. 
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~~q~ate compensation for the victim. Only the murderer's death could demonstrate the 
nite value of human life. 
Ol<~lso repulsed by blood pollution and compelled to reject the blood price, while the 
Val Testament was being assembled, the ancient Greeks, too, expressed the ultimate 
I ue of human life concretely: The convicted murderer must die. As with the ancient 
~r~Jit~s, the ancient Athenians decreed that when it came to murder-powerful and 
neb ' nch and poor-all were equal before the law. In the spirit of equal protection, 
tho ody bought his way out of homicide. The core moral correlate equally demanded 
1. at no one could be condemned to die because he was too poor to show why he should 
s~e. No ransom was allowed, but executions were prohibited until diligent inquiry 
p 
0
':ed the murder was true and certain. When it came to death as crime and death as 
n unishment, there was a single standard of justice, based upon anger and mercy, but 
ever money. 
d Abolishing the blood price, and thus extending the death penalty to the wealthy who 
t~~erve it, advanced Western Civilization. Many deep-seated values combined to produce 
d Is great advance. The Hebrews recognized that the dignity of the individual victim 
"hrnands the death of the killer. What can be said for those abolitionists today who claim 
6 Uman dignity" as exclusively their own concern, while they also claim public support 
t~~ha~ ~ey call the "better" option of"life without parole plus some monetary restitution 
e VIctim's family"? To retributivists, this seeming embrace feels retrograde and wrong. 18 
s Abraham had argued against "sweeping" away the righteous with the wicked. God had t:t away all except Noah and his family, but regretted it afterwards. Any true retributivist 
c Y must be committed to equal justice. While retributive death penalty supporters are 
s ornmg to grips with their responsibility to ensure due process and equal protection, they 
eern les f . . h 1 s aware o substantive changes they must also make m t e aw. 
Todaor neither by application nor by definition are the rich to be favo~ed o~er the !'?or. 
And:· ~ost stat~ statutes declare that a pecuniary moti~e aggr~vates an mtentwnal ~g. 
rn . OCiety applies that aggravator to professional assassms, as It should. But the pecumary 
an~hve is also applied routinely to robbery felony-murderers, who almost always are poor 
d rob from a pecuniary motive, but often do not kill from one. Many states extend the 
~th Penalty indiscriminately to robbers when somebody else did the killing, while 
or ~us corporate executives who knowingly kill and maim scores ?f unsus~ecting employees 
elCernundreds of unsuspecting consumers, strictly from a pecumary motive, are of course 
Pted from the death penalty, and rarely imprisoned. 
ex!c:s~ice must not be polluted by class bias. The poor must never be "swept along" to 
bon because they cannot pay. 
''Thou Shalt Not Forget .. . " 
lik A retributivist who maps the Old Testament onto the death penalty debate today is 
1 ekly to emphasize an independent obligation to the past, when by and large the law 
oos6 th . f p . orward, emphasizing deterrence far more than desert as e pnmary purpose o 
llnishment. But "remember what Amalek did unto thee," God specifically commands the ----ll'te~te Th~ European Union today coerces all candidates to accept the gre~t economi~ benefits .of 
of rship as the blood price in lieu of the death penalty that they are requued to abolish as a pnce 
Pro~:~r S~ould the EU break up, as seems possible, several countries such as Poland will most 
Y remstate death as punishment. 
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Israelites. '1\s ye came forth out of Egypt, how he met thee by the way, and smote the hindmost 
of thee, all that were enfeebled in the rear, when thou was faint and weary." A person who 
attacks and kills society's most vulnerable members is never to be forgotten or forgiven. 
Even if God were to give the Jews "rest from all thine enemies," they must forever kill 
Amalek on sight, "that thou shalt blot out the[ir] remembrance under heaven; thou shalt 
not forget" (Deuteronomy XXV:17). 
Those who prey on children, the elderly, the weak and infirm-today's "vulnerable 
victim" aggravated killers - should never be forgotten nor forgiven. Rich or poor, the 
victims' "blood pollutes the land .... The voice of your brother's blood cries out." The past 
counts. 
((Since He Had Not Hated His Neighbor in 
T. p '' 1me ast ... 
It was one thing to declare "the murderer he shall die:' and quite another to kill hiiJl· 
Commanded not to be satisfied with a blood price, the victim's family instead designated 
a "blood avenger" to hunt down the killer of their kin. Today we rely on police and 
prosecutors. But not all killers deserve to die. Accidents happen. For thousands of years 
cultures have marked this basic moral fact, deeply embedded in human nature: Different 
homicides call for different punishments. Intention counts. 
"Whoever strikes a man so that he dies, shall be put to death," declares Exodus categorically, 
indiscriminately. "But if he did not lie in wait for him," the passage continues, "then I wtll 
appoint for you a place to which he may flee" (Exodus XXI:l2). "You shall set apart three 
cities ... you shall prepare the roads ... so that any manslayer ... may flee to one of these 
cities and save his life . . .. But if a man willfully attacks another to kill him treacherously, you 
shall take him from my altar, that he may die" (Deuteronomy XIX:2-12). Today, instead 
of roads in good repair, the airwaves are kept clear and secure telephone lines maintained 
to the death chamber, for the Governor and the courts to issue last moment stays, so an 
execution can be reconsidered. 
By statute 3000 years ago, premeditation made a killing capital, as it still does by statute 
today, in most death penalty states. But then and now, "Whoever kills his neighbor unin_-
tentionally, not having hated him in time past-as when a man goes into the forest with htS 
neighbor to cut wood, and his hand swings the axe to cut down a tree, and the head slips 
from the handle and strikes his neighbor so that he dies, he may flee to one of these cities and 
save his life; lest the avenger of blood in hot anger pursue the manslayer and overtake him··: 
and wound him mortally, though the man did not deserve to die, since he had not hated htS 
neighbor in time past" (Deuteronomy XIX:4-7). 
This compound retributive command at once excuses the avenger who in the heat of 
passion adequately provoked, intentionally slays the accidental killer of his kin before 
he can reach the city of refuge, while at the same time explicitly resting just deserts on 
the initial killer's intent and attitude. Deuteronomy XIX displays an equally clear 
commitment not to execute those who do not deserve to die. The U.S. Supreme court 
now recognizes in its death penalty jurisprudence that retribution, perhaps the principal 
justification for punishment, limits even as it supports punitive measures. A true 
retributivist, drawing an essential lesson from Scripture, must feel at least as constrained 
to ensure that those who do not deserve to die are not killed, as to ensure that those 
who do are put to death. 
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ass If t~e roads were good and the manslayer reached the city of refuge, the congregation 
th e~ le,d and two or more witnesses were examined. How were the factfinders to decide 
toed. er s mental state, especially without a confession, to determine whether he deserved 
h' I~? ?euteronomy declares, and contemporary juries agree, that a killer who hated 
IS VICtim lik 1 . d . Wh. h . m~st e Y mten ed to kill him. Numbers XXXV also lays out the process by 
kill~c IntentiOnal (and therefore capital) murder is inferred from the manner of the 
the mg: "If he struck him down with an instrument of iron, so that he died, he is a murderer; 
Wh .~urderer shall be put to death. And if he struck him down with a stone, in the hand, by 
Th lc a man may die, and he died, he is a murderer; the murderer shall be put to death. 
by~ aven~er of blood shall himself put the murderer to death" (16-19). Numbers continues 
hi I~fernng the motive of the killer from the manner of the killing: "And if he stabbed 
Wi;m .hatred, or hurled at him lying in wait, so that he died, or in enmity struck him down 
rn hls hand, so that he died, then he who struck the blow shall be put to death; he is a 
urderer" (XXXV:22). 
Ill ~particular defendant may not have acted pursuant to his apparent motive. Because 
su OtiVes often cannot be established directly with certainty, the power of inference must 
in PP.le~ent the limitations of the evidence. As long as the factfinder has made "diligent 
b q~lry so that by best efforts the motive appears "true and certain," we cannot be frozen 
a~·~ar of possible error or that a future technology we cannot now envision will reveal 
of I er:nt truth. Absolute certainty is simply impossible. Every age has its own standards 
2Q~ertamty, its own fineness of reality, its advancing means of being convinced (see Blecker 
3:Appendix B). 
;ccustomed to Gore ... and Its Owner 
as Been Warned" 
of ~When an ox gores a man or a woman to death, the ox shall be stoned .. . but the owner 
hq: be ox shall be clear. But if the ox has been accustomed to gore in the past, and its owner 
n d .een warned but has not kept it in and it kills a man or a woman, the ox shall be stoned, 
~n n , 
5 owner also shall be put to death" (Exodus :XXI:28). 
h We can presume this was no trained killer ox. Although it was the ox that gored, a 
Ulllan · · · f d th But omisswn, failing to keep the animal confined, was a prmamate cause o ea . 
of th~e .de.fendant-o~er of the ox had not killed ~ntentionally. There was no past hatre~ 
live VIctun, no malice at all. The owner simply did not care enough about other peoples 
d'd sh He put human lives at risk, for convenience or profit. But once "warned" that he 
0
1 
ave a goring ox-a beast out of control-like many drunk drivers, robbers high 
d~~ac~, or callous corporate executives today, the owner consciously disregarded a 
Y nsk of danger. 
tlyj Many killings are neither clearly premeditated nor as freakishly accidental as an ax head 
neg~g off its handle at an odd angle. Perhaps when the woodsman swung the ax h: ~as 
'·· gent: He never noticed but should have that its head was loose and that the VIctim "'as st . , , . 
head andi?g close by in harm's way. Or he might have chosen .not to. repair the ~oose ax 
re kl, or give warning, thus knowingly putting his unsuspectmg neighbor at nsk. The 
c essness may have been real, but the risk too remote for the killer to deserve to die. 
rei ~oday many states identify a culpable mental state between negligence and intent by 
co YI~g on the Model Penal Code's definition of "recklessly," i.e. being "aware of and 
nsciously disregarding a substantial risk" of death. Most states recognize a more culpable 
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recklessness that comes from subjecting others to a "grave" risk of death rather than the 
lesser "substantial" risk. Reckless homicide also may become murder when a number of 
people are placed at risk. Whatever risk the goring ox presented at the time, it seems grave 
looking back upon it after the victim has been gored. Back then and today, however, what 
morally makes the killing murder was not the risk as much as the attitude of the risk taker. 
Taking grave risks and ignoring a "prior warning" support the inference that the actor 
was indifferent to the lives of others. Although it need not involve anger or hate, scheming 
or plotting, a "depraved indifference to human life" -unintentional but wanton and 
abandoned- can be every bit as heinous as a premeditated intent to kill. 
Although the Goring Ox illustrates how non-intentional killings may sometimes deserve 
death, unlike the premeditated murderer or capital perjurer, the Old Testament did allow 
a depraved indifference reckless killer to settle up. Despite being death-eligible, the owner 
might escape with his life, if the court or victim's family were willing to accept a blood 
price. Only for this reckless and indirectly caused homicide does Biblical law permit 
ransom. How much? The sky was the limit: "He shall give for the redemption of his life 
whatever is laid on him" (Exodus XXI:30). As an alternative to death, no penalty was too 
great; whatever was demanded of the reckless killer, whether by the court or the victim's 
family, he was to give in return for his life. The greater power to execute included the 
lesser power to strip the offender of everything he owned, consigning him to poverty and 
misery. 
Today too, states generally punish a depraved indifference reckless murder as the moral 
equivalent of intentional murder. Although the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Tison v. 
Arizona (1987) that a State may execute a person who does not intend to kill as long as 
the actor's reckless indifference was a primary cause of the victim's death, many states 
reject that option, reserving the death penalty and its temporary substitute, life without 
parole, exclusively for intentional killers. 
Alive or dead, an ox was valuable. But the command was clear: "It shall be stoned and 
its flesh shall not be eaten" (Exodus XXI:28). Do not profit from the killer's death. the 
incalculable non-utilitarian value of human life demanded that any future benefits be 
sacrificed to the past. The instrument of death, a living being, was to be treated as 
responsible and not made an object of gain. Usefulness must be shunned, lest the past 
and the humanity of the slain- the reason for the punishment- be forgotten. Although 
they often travel together, even in the same sentence, utilitarianism and retribution 
ultimately clash. 
In Biblical times as now, the vast majority of unintentional killings did not deserve 
punishment by death. ''If he stabbed him suddenly without enmity," continues Numbe~s 
XXXV in its detailed gradations of homicide, "or hurled anything on him without lying 111 
wait, or used a stone, by which a man may die, and without seeing him cast it upon him, so 
that he died, though he was not his enemy, and did not seek his harm, then the congregatio~ 
shall judge between the manslayer and the avenger of blood, in accordance with these ordinances 
(16-24). 
If diligent inquiry determined the killing was accidental, negligent, or even ordinarilY 
reckless, but not intentional, again, there must be "cities of refuge for you, that the manslayer 
who kills any person without intent, through error or unawares-may flee there" (Numbers 
XXXV:ll). The negligent or reckless killer must live therein, until the high priest died· 
If the unintentional killer prematurely ventured from his place of refuge, the avenger of 
blood was authorized to kill him on the spot. Inside the city of refuge, however, the un-
intentional killer was free to live. 
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Ancient Greece 
''If T' I Order You to Set Me Free ... You Must 
Ie Me Tighter" 
in ~~reas the Israelites saw a transcendent God ruling the universe with humans created 
rui ~Sbtmage and struggling to comprehend His ways, the ancient Greeks saw a "world 
at : 4)_ 1r ···gods human in their passions, a world ruled by caprice" (Guthrie 1962:Vol.I, 
to Bo~er recounts that when the goddess Circe reluctantly released her beloved Odysseus 
thec~~tmue his progress home, she warned of several deadly perils awaiting him, especially 
tat· trens, whose song he must at all costs ignore. Odysseus prepared to withstand temp-
ton by r . . h" 
befi tmtttng IS own power to lead his men to their mutual destruction. Thus, 
th ore they reached the Sirens, the men put wax in their ears and bound Odysseus to 
e mast. 
0d"If I implore you and order you to set me free, you must tie me up tighter than ever," 
Ysseus had demanded. 
ani:;d when Odysseus heard "sounds sweet as honey," the Sirens' call- "Come this way 
set sten ~,o our voice! " -he was aroused: "I longed to listen and I ordered the men to 
pr me free (Homer 1937:132). Now they were all in a bind: Did the later command take 
111 eced~nce? Then was then; now is now. Had Odysseus the right to change his mind? The 
ro:~ re)ect~d their leader's attempt to countermand his earlier command, and kept on 
pr ~g until the danger passed. Only because a rational Odysseus at an earlier time had 
su~VJ.d~d procedures for keeping his own passion in check, and only because his men could 
Ordmate the present and keep covenants with the past, did they all survive this trial. 
ou The lesson should be clear to a society where the People are sovereign: We must limit 
repr ~':n power to act on our passions of the moment, or face self-destruction. In a 
leg·ul he, public passion is filtered through the People's elected representatives. And when 
ts a tures d . . . il . , tl th . Passi or a mmtstratwns are tempted summar y to execute society s ou aws, eir 
A.p ons _too must be restrained, by their constitutions and judges sworn to uphold them. 
ou:'ropnate punishment, morally commanded, becomes possible in the face of public 
en rage an~ the urge to act immediately only if we find a way to restrain passion long 
Pe o~gh to mvestigate and deliberate. To be reliably and fairly administered, the death 
cona ty must operate as a deliberate product of a deliberative process. Popular opinion 
Unts b ' ut only for so much. 
l11aAnd so it is today, roughly 3000 years after Odysseus ordered himself bound to the 
ele st, that constitutional rights operate to check the passions of the People and their 
cted re · f h \vith presentatlves. In the end, the constitutional guarantee o Due Process toget er 
op the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishments," 
as '~~:te,_ as Justice Thurgood Marshall declared, concurring in Furman v. Georgia (1972), 
r Insulation from our baser selves" (p. 345). 
~Socr~·. Overwhelmingly here, Guthrie's (1962) multivolume history brings alive the world of the Pre-
f>Iato'st~s, Socrates and the Sophists, and much of Plato. Except for som~ later sectio~s interpreting 
sorner aws a_nd Statesman, and Aristotle's Ethics and Politics, this essay rehes on Guthne throughout, 
sp0 n .trnbl es Wtthout quotes, in essential though fragmentary phrasing. Guthrie should not be held re-
St e ho r . 
' wever, tOr mappmg the death penalty. 
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((If All Agree .. :' 
Human beings feel a primal urge to retaliate when a member of their family is slain· 
In Homer's time, the Heroic Age, roughly 1200-800 B.C., homicide was strictly personal· 
The killer escaped, the victim's family caught and killed him, or the blood price settled 
it monetarily with the victim's family (Bonner and Smith 2000:Vol. II, at 192).20 
Killers who escaped the family's initial wrath could go into exile and, as with Cain, 
were safe from retaliation, as long as they stayed away. The blood price acted only partlY 
as compensation to the family for its loss. It also helped defray sacrifices "to appease the 
spirit of the dead" (Bonner and Smith 2000:Vol. I, at 21). Homer reveals no distinctions 
among homicides, except special horror at killing one's own kin. But early human beings 
must have known intuitively that some killings were worse than others. Recognizing that 
accidents do happen brings a feeling of restraint, nearly as primal as the urge for revenge. 
Draco's gift to Athens, its first written Constitution, was so indiscriminately bloodY', 
with death as the standard punishment for a host of crimes, that even now "draconian' 
means "harsh, severe, barbarously cruel." The Old Testament also looks like a bloodY 
code. Of course, today it is a crime against humanity for any government to exterminate 
homosexuals as such, or put people to death for worshiping the wrong gods. Today, we 
know better. 
Except for homicide. We have refined but not rejected Scripture's substantive distinctions. 
Biblical homicide law's commanded process and presumption of innocence continue as 
basic mandates in the United States. We have grown but kept connected to those roots. 
So too, when Solon rid Athens of Draco's bloody code and substituted a whole new Con-
stitution, a whole new set of laws designed to last unchanged for at least another hundred 
years, the great lawgiver kept virtually intact Draco's law of homicide, which was largelY 
a codification of earlier practice (Bonner and Smith 2000:Vol. I, at 133). 
But one great change had taken place in the culture since the time of Homer: The com-
munity had become consciously and emotionally involved. As with the ancient Hebrews, 
for the ancient Greeks the decisive change was the idea- really a feeling- that "blood 
pollutes the land" (Numbers XXXV:33). 
Because he was polluted, the manslayer himself posed a public menace. While at lar~e 
in public places, the guilty killer would contaminate society. In Athens, the victim's familY 
initiated the homicide prosecution, and once they publicly accused the killer, pollution 
immediately attached, and an interdiction automatically issued. During preliminary i~­
vestigation the accused, now polluting, was strictly prohibited from appearing in pubbC 
places. If he violated that interdiction, anybody could legally kill him on the spot (Bonner 
and Smith 2000:Vol. II, at 193). 
Although the government had taken over homicide trials, the victim's family prosecuted-
They might prefer a monetary settlement, but blood pollution complicated that remedY· 
A money settlement with the family would leave a contaminating killer at large. The 
response to homicide had become more than merely personal pay back: Only punishm~nt 
sufficient to cancel the pollution would end the public threat. And only the communitY 
would determine which punishment was sufficient. But in a code where death is the casual 
and indiscriminate punishment for petty crimes, why not play it safe and make death th~ 
punishment for all homicide? Because all killings are not alike. Animating the Ol 
20. Robert Bonner and Gertrude Smith's two-volum~ The Administration of justice from Horrtef 
to Aristotle (2000) supplies most of the details here for homicide jurisprudence in ancient Greece. 
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Testament th. 
in w, ' IS moral fact also animated the Ancient Greeks. There seems a basic impulse 
oth estern culture to mark off officially-specially denounce and distinguish from all 
the·ers~the worst killings. Today in the U.S. many states execute no one, yet cling to 
I Ir capital statutes as a way to distinguish and denounce. Bonner and Smith (2000:Vol. 
t~ ~~ 1?3) suggest that homicide became a public concern less to assure prosecution, than 
mzzt punishment by distinguishing different killings correctly. 
eq This feeling that the victim's blood morally pollutes us until the killer is dealt with ad-
de UatelY-this felt need to sort out homicides and punish killers only as deserved-this 
ep-seated retributive urge perpetually moves death penalty advocates. 
hai;Death is different" became cliche in Supreme Court capital jurisprudence this last 
pu ~~ntury, and now seems only partly true. But although death may have been a common 
tre Uis ment for a host of crimes in ancient times, as crime, homicide has always been 
st~ted specially. Even a lawgiver like Draco, who used death indiscriminately as a penalty, 
spec~~refull! distinguished among homicides. Although execution has not always been a 
1 
pumshment, murder since the beginning has been a special sort of crime. 
the ~e aris~ocratic Aeropagus, the highest court of legal guardians which descended from 
be tyr omenc Council of Elders, sat en masse to try premeditated murderers and would-
sep ants.zt The Athenians so cared about distinguishing homicides that they established 
kill ~rate courts to try separate types of killings. One court of fifty-one tried unpremeditated 
wh Ing~; another dealt with justifiable killings. A special court was established for one 
kill 0 killed again while in exile for a prior killing. Aristotle tells us that these recidivist 
de£ ers, already banished and now facing another charge of homicide, conducted their 
19?~~~~ fro~ a boat lest they contaminate the court assembled ~nth~ shor~ (Aristo.tle 
jurisd· ~). Fmaily, there was a special denunciatory court for umdentified killers, Wlth 
bein !Chon also over animals and inanimate objects that had caused the death of human 
gs (Bonner and Smith 2000:Vol. I, at 110). 
go ~er P~eliminary investigation, at any time prior to trial the accused could voluntarily 
sta ~to ~xile, thereby implicitly confessing his guilt, and be banished forever. Or he could 
als n tnal and after hearing the prosecution's opening, still choose to go into exile. This 
2.0~o~rnounted to a guilty plea, and again the exile would be for life (Bonner an~ Smith 
th .Vol. I, at 108; liB). Forever banished from his homeland, forever contammated, 
ge ere COuld never be a pardon. Even after factional wars and coups were settled with 
fronera} amnesties and wholesale pardons, in Ancient Greece homicide was always exempt 
ev rn Pardon. EWOP-exile without pardon-meant that. No hope of seeing home, 
alt~r. Today, there is no statute of limitations for murder, and so far in the United States 
ough no longer in Europe, LWOP truly means life without parole or pardon.22 
\Vi~ a killer who had fled before trial found life without his native Attica unbearable 
th out hope of parole, and snuck back home, anybody could legally kill him or alert 
to~a~tho~ities- "hale him into court" (Bonner and Smith 2000:Vol. I, at 121). Like 
co Y s Pnson escapee, or lifer who kills again, he who violated exile would generally be 
nsldered · · b ll · · · d th mcorngi le, undeterrable, permanently po uting-a contmumg anger to 
e comm . , h . . 
umty-and deserving death. "Haling him into Court wast e mnovatwn; ----=---F 21. Eve · · fth II · "d · or th ry soctety IS most angry at "treason"- the direct attack on the core o e co ect:Ive 1 entity: 
ilnci e Israelites the worst treason was to worship false gods or engage others in the attempt. For 
l, ate~tthenians, the worst treason is the attempt to establish a tyranny (Bonner and S~th 200~:Vol. 
22 ). Just as anyone could kill the killer who returned to pollute, anyone could kill the traitor. 
death· Today of course, LWOP holds out only the slimmest hope of executive clemency. Should the 
Penalty be eliminated, however, undoubtedly as in Europe, LWOP would be next under attack. 
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killing him on sight (Bonner and Smith 2000:Vol. II, at 193) was the ancient option. "It 
shall be permitted to slay [illegally returning] homicides ... but not to abuse them or to 
extort blackmail;' the Athenian Code declared. No torture, even of the condemned who 
had returned to pollute the community. And no blackmail-life could not be bought: 
No blood price-for blood pollutes the land. 
Death was different in ancient Greece. Witnesses were always sworn in homicide cases, 
whereas in other cases they testified under oath only at the demand of the other.sid~ 
(Bonner and Smith 2000:Vol. I, at 108). An accused killer who stood trial and was conv1cte 
of unpremeditated homicide was banished for a year or two, or until he received a pardon 
from the victim's family, which paid the debt and thereby ended the pollution. But the 
family had to be unanimous: "If there is a father or a brother or sons let them grant 
pardon to the homicide if all agree. Otherwise the one who opposes it shall prevent 
pardon" (Bonner and Smith 2000: Vol. I, at 113). 
"Like Members of the Same Body .. :' 
Although an accused who had gone into exile before the verdict could never receive a 
pardon from the family or the court, if he did stand trial and was found justified, he 
would be released without punishment or debt. But if convicted of premeditated murder, 
as in the Bible, he was put to death (Bonner and Smith 2000:Vol. II, at 194-195). TodaY 
too, many States continue to make a premeditated killer death-eligible, while other capital 
statutes reject planning per seas morally irrelevant. 
But now as then, premeditated murder was worse than involuntary manslaughter, 
which was worse than justified or accidental killing. Passion killings have always been a 
problem: "If anyone kills without premeditation ... he shall be exiled," the Athenian Code 
declared. "If one slays another who is the aggressor (i.e., in a quarrel) . . . the kings shall 
decide the nature of the homicide .... The same procedure shall be followed whether a 
slave is killed or a free man" (Bonner and Smith 2000:Vol. I, at 114). And under the 
Athenian penal code, as today: "If a man while defending himself kills another on the 
spot who is unjustly and forcibly carrying off his property there shall be no punishm~nt 
for the slaying"23 (at 114). Although Draco reputedly was the first in Athens to distinguish 
premeditated, unpremeditated, and justified or accidental killing, 2500 years later these 
distinctions: intentional- provoked- reckless- accidental- justifiable- seeJll 
permanently part of human nature-deeply embedded, and real. 
And then there was felony murder. In ancient Athens, where the homicide was 
connected with some other crime such as robbery or burglary or kidnapping, anyon~ 
with knowledge of the killing could initiate prosecution. The accused was imprisone 
until trial, before a stripped-down court of eleven (Bonner and Smith 2000:Vol. II, a~ 
214). Death was the penalty. So among homicides, only premeditated murder an 
felony murder got the death penalty. Twenty-three hundred years later in 1794, 
Pennsylvania became the first State again to reach this advanced stage by enacting a 
new statute that restricted the death penalty to "murder in the 1st degree," which 
comprised premeditated homicide and felony murder. More than two centuries later 
in many states, today these two aggravating circumstances account for the bulk of the 
condemned. 
23. Scholars have disagreed among themselves but where the killing was justified, the killer waS 
probably not considered polluting, and definitely did not owe payback to the victim's family. 
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co Although the victim's family generally initiated homicide prosecutions, and could 
ob~~ute sentences, trial and punishment were in the name of the People. "If a man 
ove at~ a conviction for murder," Demosthenes informs us, "even then he gets no power 
Wit~~: conde~ned, w~o. fo,r pun~shment is given up to the laws and to pers~ns charged 
cond t office. The VIctims family, however, was guaranteed the right to behold the 
and Se~ned suffering the penalty which the law imposes, but nothing further" (Bonner 
Was mah 2000:Vol. II, at 193). When Timothy McVeigh, the Oklahoma City bomber, 
of thput to death, opinion was split over whether the public generally, or only the families 
e 168 · · ulti VIctims, should be allowed to witness the execution. The U.S. Attorney General 
fa,., mil.ately ordered the execution broadcast on dosed-circuit TV, but only to the victims' 
"' Ies. 
de~ether they went into exile before trial, or went to trial and were convicted and con-
at 19ned, ~remeditated killers were allowed no pardon (Bonner and Smith 2000:Vol. II, 
to 4). Like Odysseus at the mast, the ancient lawgivers put it out of their own power 
vic~~consider. No matter how old and infirm the killer, how distant the memory of the 
You u;:• how diminished the cost to the family, the pollution never ended- "the voice of 
r rather's blood" cried out permanently. The past counted, forever. 
vic~ith one exception: Regardless of the community's or family's wishes, when a dying 
Wo~~ forgave ~is attacker, no pollution attached, even for premeditated murder. There 
hand, :e ~o tn~l; .the family could exact no penalty, nothing was .owed. On t~e other 
be dymg VIctim could beg his surviving relatives to avenge his death, whtch then 
came th · 1 I II 9 ) With . eu so ;mn moral o?Iigation (Bonner and Smith 200~:Vo. , at 1 5-19~ . 
had the Idea of blood pollutwn" in the Old Testament and Ancient Greece, humamty 
if it ~aken a giant step. Blood pollution binds the community to the slain, and expresses 
Stat oes not create a communal urge to execute cold-blooded killers. In "the best governed 
tha; ~h · those who were not wronged were no less diligent in prosecuting wrongdoers 
duty. "o~e. who ~ad personally suffered," declared Solon. And not merely from abstra~t 
;,.,J. . Cttizens like members of the same body should feel and resent one another s 
'"'' unes" (B . bact h onner 1927:60). Ancient utilitarians must have urged executiOn to prevent a 
dead ar~est, the surest proof of contamination. But blood pollution-the voice of the 
Us· crYing out in anger and anguish as his killer living free, pollutes the land-calls to 
lllama · · 'tl · al Ne nner not stnctly empirical, moves us to act from motives not stnc Y ratiOn . 
vertheiess, to those of us who feel morally obliged, the urge to punish is real. 
Un ~though homicide law seems relatively unchanged in general, and remained virtually 
un~el;nged ~uring the three centuries between Draco and Aristotle, seemingly stagnant, 
Cult consciOus, and stuck in quasi-religious ancient ruts, beneath the surface Western 
deat~re Was germinating core philosophical and scientific foundations on which modern 
Penalty jurisprudence rests. 
lhales 
(or~Wenty-five centuries ago, Western mathematics begins with Thales, who discovered 
'l'h~nve~ted) an abstract process of proof by which we can all arrive at the same truth. 
tClJc ~' like Solon, traveled to Egypt and observed royal revenue agents trying to determine 
flo ~ atements due to farmers whose once rectangular plots had shrunk after the Nile 
theo ed. A practical people, the Egyptians had developed rules of thumb for measuring 
l'h earth. Thales alone apparently felt the need to prove their truth (Kline 1953: 16-17). 
Us Was the state of geometry-earth measure-when reason in the West leaped from 
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taxes calculated on changing land masses to the permanently important abstraction, 
mathematics. Thales' great contribution was truth by proof, through methods that were 
repeatable, demonstrable, and permanent. Mathematics is an abstract process separate 
from concrete reality-the stuff to which it usefully applies. A proposition was true by 
virtue of a universally shared process of proof applied to basic axioms (Guthrie 1975:23; 
Kline 1953:24; Plato 1957:5). Once the rules were given, the conclusions necessarily 
followed by pure analysis. 
Mathematics became law's ideal. In a society with a rule of law, something deeply 
worth having, general rules classify situations and specify penalties. Given the substance-
what counts, what features matter, what criteria the rules use in classifying-specific 
situations call for certain responses. Regardless of whether powerful people actually do 
get away with it, as a matter of analysis they have "broken the law." Capital murder can 
be said to have been committed even if it goes unpunished. 
Capital jurisprudence today is largely about process: How do we establish guilt and the 
appropriately attaching penalty? Who has the burden of persuasion and by what weight; 
who decides who lives or dies, and how? From ancient times until now, death penalty 
process has involved diligent inquiry to achieve a necessary measure of certainty before 
we risk executing the innocent. Today we dispute whether proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt is a standard sufficient to support a sentence of death. Within a few centuries after 
the Old Testament was stitched together, Talmudic rabbis resisted literally applying death 
penalty law to a host of crimes that they sensed did not deserve capital punishment. Ever 
since, feeling constitutionally constrained to keep the punishment in principle, abolitionist 
jurists have attempted covertly to abolish an inhumane law by making it impossible to 
apply in practice. "Proof to an absolute certainty;'24 for example, is an absurd standard, 
simply unattainable in the real world, although standards more strict than "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt" might well be applied before the state takes the life of its own citizens. 
Before imposing death as punishment for murder, special, super due process remainS 
a basic cultural norm: The Old Testament's two witness rule; deeply discounting snitch 
testimony; insisting on diligent inquiry; accepting proof only if it is true and certain; 
staying far from slaying the innocent with the guilty. Today's emphasis on DNA testing, 
competent counsel, diligent investigation, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, is all 
about constitutionally guaranteed process for determining the truth. Whatever the content 
of the axioms or aggravators-whatever the stuff that makes a person deserve life in 
prison or death-equal protection requires assigning guilt and applying punishment 
equally across race and class. 
Process-questions of who decides and how to decide who deserves to die-can, of 
course, directly influence who lives or dies. Solon redistributed power and wealth to the 
lower classes by giving them juries. In 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Ring v. 
Arizona that juries and not judges must find the facts on which the death penalty is based-
Who decides may determine what is decided: Substance and process do affect each other. 
Due process requires clear categories. Otherwise they will be held void for vagueness, for 
giving inadequate notice to the sentencer of what counts as the worst of the worst. 
Anaximander, Thales' student, rejected his teacher's scientific theory that water was 
the single basic stuff of the universe, in favor of pairs of successively encroaching opposites 
such as hot-cold, moist-dry. Drawing upon even more ancient retributive metaphor, 
24. I have no absolute certainty that my computer will not rebel in disgust at this essay, attack 
and kill me, yet I bravely write on. 
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~aximan~er explained the essential dynamic, the changing seasons, as injustice followed r: re~aratwn . This explanatory metaphor of injustice and reparation, like the basic 
lik nct~on of punishment in the Old Testament, drew on the most elemental feeling: A 
I e-kind response can restore a prior balance thrown out of equilibrium (Guthrie 1962:Vol. 
'at 84). When the United States was founded, this same metaphor of encroachment-
Power encroaching on liberty-saturated the debate. Leading opponents of the death 
~nalty today embrace that metaphor, basing their opposition not so much on a conviction 
0 
a~ .~0 one deserves to die, but that government with the power to kill inevitably encroaches 
n 1 erty (see Bedau 1997). 
u ~na~imenes, Anaximander's student, returned to Thales' credo of a single stuff 
v n ~rlymg reality-in his case air. How to explain earth, water, and fire? Simply by 
~}'l?g how much of that stuff was in any given space (Guthrie 1962:Vol. I, at 140). 
£ aximenes' insight had secured a basic foundation for death penalty jurisprudence: Dif-
"~~nces of kind-substantial differences-were really at bottom differences of degree. 
re e ~ord 'unusual:" declared the first Justice White more than a century ago, "primarily 
a strams the courts .. . from inflicting lawful modes of punishment to so unusual a degree 
s to cause the punishment to be illegal" (Weems v. United States 1910:409). 
r" In the Old Testament as today, recklessness permits of more or less-more or less 
/st;,', more or less unconcerned with others' fate. Beyond a certain degree, a "substantial 
~s becomes "grave," indifference becomes "depraved:' and reckless manslaughter becomes 
in Urder. Intent can be formed less and less suddenly until it becomes premeditated. Today, 
r rnany states, the killer's indifference to or positive enjoyment of the victim's suffering 
~aches a point where it becomes "callous" or "cruel," or the suffering itself reaches a point 
~sustained intensity where it becomes torture, thereby making the killing death-eligible. 
a Oral blameworthiness diminishes with youth or mental impairment until it becomes 
n absolute bar to the death penalty (Atkins v. Virginia 2002; Roper v. Simmons 2005). 
Differences in degree become differences in kind,· too much discretion becomes un-
con f . s Itutwnal caprice. 
''I lllposing Limits on the Unlimited to 
Make the Limited ... " 
Weihe formal impulse leapt forward with Pythagoras: The universe ~as~ kosmos-a 
th .0 r?ered whole-proportional, measurable, rational. From the begmmng, Good-
e.hrnaed and ordered-was set against Evil-chaotic and unlimited. The kosmos was 
~allltained by imposing measures or limits on the unlimited to make the limited (Guthrie 
62=Vol. I, at 206-207). 
So too, the moral kosmos of the death penalty. 
r ~oved by a conviction that lesser crimes deserve proportionately lesser punishment, etnb f · h d it-t u lVIst advocates today would punish with death all, b.ut only those~ o, eserve 
. . he worst of the worst. Punishment must be proportiOnal to the cnme and the 
criminal. 
h. "If th.e guilty man deserves to be beaten," declares Deuteronomy, "the judge shall cause 
1111 to l d .r · · · h. offense ,1Ane owthn and be beaten in his presence with a number ~~hst:"1p~skmdpropobrtwn tob 1;, 
()Qcy · o er translation has it, "according to the measure o1 1s wrc e ness, Y num er 
P :1~. This is thoroughly Pythagorean. The Magna Carta shared this commitment to 
roporhonality almost a thousand years ago when it declared, ·~free man shall be amerced 
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for a small fault only according to the measure thereof, and for a great crime according to its 
magnitude" (Eng. Magna Carta 1215: Sec. 20). 
In 1892, dissenting in O'Neill v. Vermont-one of the Supreme Court's first forays 
into the meaning of "cruel and unusual"- Justice Field would have invalidated a 
punishment of 54 years at hard labor for selling liquor without a license. True, there was 
no physical torture, but the punishment was disproportional- "exceeding in severitY 
considering the offense" (at 338). The Eighth Amendment was "directed against all pun-
ishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the 
offenses charged" (at 340, emphasis added). 
During the modern era of death penalty jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has 
embraced Justice Field's standard, consistently demanding proportionality when evaluating 
the constitutionality of the death penalty: In Coker v. Georgia (1977), the Court held 
death as "grossly disproportionate" for raping an adult woman. Thirty years later, in 
Kennedy v Louisiana (2008) the Court S-4 also held death unconstitutional for the rape 
of a child, which although "devastating;' was not comparable to murder. In Atkins V 
Virginia (2002), the Court eliminated death as punishment for mentally retarded 
defendants; and later eliminated death as disproportional punishment for murder 
committed when the defendant was less than eighteen (Roper v. Simmons 2005). In each 
case, death became "cruel and unusual" precisely because it was disproportionate to the 
heinousness of the crime or criminal. In the tradition of Pythagoras, many states today 
require a "proportionality review;' where an appellate court measures the death sentence 
in the particular case against other similar murders and murderers to determine whether 
it is comparatively disproportionate. 
Committed to proportional punishment, today's retributivist death penalty advocates 
embrace a Pythagorean program, seeking to impose limits, to moderate unlimited anger 
at each particular murder and measure it instead against the worst possible. The retributivist 
resists the "kill them all" set, so bent on revenge they would indulge in limitless and 
formless rage. For the retributivist death penalty advocate, unlimited and unrestrained 
punishment is evil. The retributivist advocate also disagrees with abolitionists for whorn 
death is always disproportionate, no matter how heinous the murderer. The retributivist 
embraces Pythagoras' faith that society can limit punishment without eliminating the le-
gitimate impulse to hurt those who injure us. When it comes to homicide, restraints can 
be imposed on unlimited rage to ensure limited and proportional punishment. 
"You Cannot Step in the Same River Twice ... " 
Heraclitus rejected Pythagoras' ideal of a stable, rational, peaceful and harmonious 
world. The basic fact was strife; everything was in continuous motion and change, all 
flux and flow. "You cannot step in the same river twice;' he famously summed up, "for 
fresh waters flow on." Thus, he also rebelled against the Pythagoreans' clear-cut distinctions 
between good and evil. "To God, all things are good and fair and just"; it was all relative 
(Guthrie 1962:Vol. I, at 450; 448). A contemporary Heraclitean denies we can meaningfullY 
categorize homicides in advance, by relying on real differences among types of killings. 
Since everything is in flux, no two situations ever repeat, therefore no two killings are 
alike. General rules can never deal adequately with non-repeating concrete specific 
situations. Every killing and killer is unique. And as Heraclitus declared, beneath all 
apparent calm and stability lies an unceasing struggle and the clash of contrary tensions. 
In order to reach a "just" result, a jury's verdict of guilt and its sentence of life-or death-
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lllust be the d f . . . 
Pr pro uct o vigorous contentiOn between active defense counsel and state osecutor. 
of Ex~reme Heracliteans, today's moral anarchists, see the death penalty as the product 
whstnfe rather than consensus, where those in power arbitrarily and capriciously kill 
op om. they choose and then call it justice. As Heraclitus insisted, everything was relative; 
off~Sites were identical (Guthrie 1962:Vol. I, at 452). The difference between the worst 
to e Worst and the thoroughly justified was ad hoc, depending on who had the power 
lllake the label stick. 
For Her lit · · · th . ac us, a nver was nothmg more than the constantly changmg stuff that flowed 
to:ough It. Any identity must be found in its form (Guthrie 1962:Vol. I, at 467). People, 
P 
: Were constantly changing. Biologists inform us that all the cells in our bodies 
enod ' 11 
wo d Ica Y are replaced, yet still we are the same persons we were. Or are we? Plato 
liv n ered about it in the Symposium: "Even during the period for which any living being 
ag:~nd retains ~is identit~- as a man is called the same m.an from boyhood to ol~ 
say h he ~oes not m fact retam the same attributes, although he IS called the same person, 
ch s t e Wise Diotima to Socrates. ''And not only his body, but his soul as well. No man's 
aracter h b't . . d . . d c . al th ne ' a I s, opmwns, esires, pleasures, pams an 1ears remam ways e same: 
w ones come into existence and old ones disappear" (Guthrie 1962:Vol. I, at 467). 
al Oddly, those who believe that permanent rehabilitation or redemption is possible must 
p:o~onfront the Heraclitean challenge. Retributivist advocates of a proportional death 
es n ~y may acknowledge that while time marks a body, and personality does change, 
sentta} ch t · · h' £ "R 'b · · d 
111 arac er remams constant. ''A man's character IS IS ate. etn utiVISt a vocates 
rejUst also meet Heraclitus head on and insist that killings do resemble each other in 
cr 'tev~nt ways. They can be distinguished as more or less deserving of punishment, by 
I ena sp 'fi d . . eci e m advance and applied in an adversary settmg. 
a ~ns the. end, even Heracl!tus .backed away from his extreme moral nihilis~, emb~acing 
Oth~ tenous concept of a 'ratiOnal fire" which operated as a standard ag~ms~ ':hich all 
Pe al stuff was measured and evaluated (Guthrie 1962: Vol. I, at 462). RetnbutlVlst death 
su~· t~ supporters today might see this "rational fire" as "informed emotion" -at once 
ca J~cttve, particular, and evanescent-yet an intuitive standard whose heat, when felt, 
n e applied. 
((\,r 
J.vtan Is the Measure ... " 
itse~fter Parmeni.des _insisted that the entire world of the senses, in.cludi~g movement 
th ' Was all an IllusiOn, and his disciple Zeno backed up these claims with paradoxes 
tu at could not be refuted, the Greeks, in disgust at obviously absurd scientific theories, 
rned th · · · d h ki d "M · th 
111 eir attentiOn mward, away from the universe an onto uman n . an IS e 
fireasure of all things; of the things that are, that they are," proclaimed Protagoras, the 
II stand greatest Sophist, "of the things that are not, that they are not" (Guthrie 1962:Vol. 
'at 4· PI ' ato 1957:152). A new age of humanism had dawned. 
by :ro~essional teachers traveled from city to city, publicly competing f?r big fees, paid 
ent ~ous parents eager for their children to master the art of rhetonc so they could 
loc~r:am at ~~e Assembly and convince at the law courts. Wanting n? problem~ fr?~ the 
or Uthonttes, these Sophists proclaimed that whatever seemed nght to an mdlVldual 
wh a State, was right. They preached situational ethics: Good was whatever worked; truth 
atever 1 c . ali ever . peop e 10und pleasmg and could be persuaded to act upon; re ty was appearance; 
Ythtng was relative, subjective, arbitrary. We live today, and for tomorrow. 
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Man is the measure-the measured and the measurer. 
In the other corner, looking like a boxer with a crushed nose, weighing in tenaciously 
against this relativist, individualist, empiricist outlook, Socrates battled the Sophists, 
insisting on "absolute standards, permanent and unvarying truths existing above." And 
for Plato, Socrates' disciple, good and evil- "concepts such as justice ... and equality 
exist apart from the human mind." They are independent and constant standards "to 
which human perceptions and human actions can and must be referred" (Guthrie 1962:Vol. 
II, at 4). 
Whether death penalty abolitionist or advocate, this commitment to the transcendence 
of moral facts such as "human dignity" -or not-still fractures the debate. 
To the Sophists the solution was clear: If you convince people and entertain theJll, 
they will shower you with money and power. Live in the present; look forward to the 
future, learn how to manipulate the world to your advantage. A skilled rhetorician can 
convince anyone of anything. Appearances are deceptive but can be manipulated. EverY 
question has two sides. Argue effectively- there is no truth. Appearance is reality. Whatever 
a person thinks is good, is good as long as he thinks it. If he thinks stealing from us or 
killing us is good, we merely have to change his mind. 
"In punishing wrongdoers;' Protagoras declared, "no one concentrates on the fact that 
a man has done wrong in the past, or punishes him on that account, unless taking blind 
vengeance like a beast. No, punishment is not inflicted by a rational man for the sake of 
the crime that has been committed (after all one cannot undo what is past) but for the 
sake of the future, to prevent either the same man or, by the spectacle of his punishment, 
someone else, from doing wrong again" (Plato 1956:324b). 
When it came to justifying punishment, Plato also looked forward, insisting in fhe 
Laws, his last and least idealistic dialogue and the only one where Socrates is absent, that 
almost every criminal could be rehabilitated through education. Plato did, however, 
anticipate some "hard shell"- today we call them "hard core"- recidivists who could 
not be softened to society. Even for these villains, Plato never expressed satisfaction at 
punishment as retributively deserved for past bad acts. "For truly judgment by sentence 
of law is never inflicted for harm's sake. Its normal effect is one of two: It makes him that 
suffers it a better man, or, failing this, less of a wretch:' The worst of the worst were simP~Y 
better off dead: "Longer life is no boon to the sinner himself in such a case, and that hiS 
decease will bring a double blessing to his neighbors; it will be a lesson to them to keeP 
themselves from wrong, and will rid society of an evil man. These are the reasons for 
which a legislator is bound to ordain the chastisement of death for such desperate villainies, 
and for them alone" (Plato 1978:862e-863). 
However they divided on other issues, Plato and Protagoras wanted the death penalty 
reserved only for incorrigibles, and justified capital punishment by its future benefit to 
society, especially its deterrent effect. "The ayme of punishment is not a revenge but 
terrour;' concurred Hobbes, the fi~st modern Sophist (Hobbes 1651:355). 
For today's Sophists-who for centuries have been calling themselves utilitarians-
no less than for Protagoras, the past has passed. Retribution is "irrational," beastly. The 
rational person-a rational policy maker-looks only to the future, comparing cos.ts 
and benefits. Punishment rehabilitates if possible, incapacitates when necessary, but lfl 
any case primarily deters. Utilitarians today continue to make capital punishment a 
question of cost and benefit. And they consult public opinion exclusively for what is just. 
Does the majority support the death penalty? If so, let's have it - if not, let's not. Man 
is the measure. 
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llla ~is~araging polls as beside the point, many abolitionists and all retributive advocates 
Un.mtam that there are moral facts. The death penalty is humane or inhumane-just or 
fa JUst-whether or not it is popular, or most effectively deters murder. There is a moral 
ct of the . . 
ab r . . matter-transcendent, rea!, and divorced from present practice. Most 
ev~ lt_lOn~sts know-not merely believe, but know-that the death penalty is inhumane, 
Statn If nmety percent of the people support it. Most proponents, both in the United 
is es an~ Europe, know- also independently of public opinion-that capital punishment 
ult~omehmes just. Ironically, retributive advocates and many abolitionists can never 
fac:~atel~ reconcile, precisely because they share this anti-Sophistic commitment to moral 
' Which can never be verified by polling. 
fro Today's death penalty debate divides along original fault lines that separated the Sophists 
pr m ?ocrates and Plato. Some opponents seize on the increasing unpopularity of certain 
ju act~ces such as the paralytic agent used in lethal injection executions, or executing 
w~eniles and the mentally retarded, as grounds to find them unconstitutional. However, 
ba :n c?nfronted with overwhelming public support for a punishment he considered a 
op~I~ VlO!ation of human dignity, Justice Marshall in Furman appealed not to public 
ide~I?n, but rather to "informed public opinion" -an unwritten, transcendent Platonic 
If ever there was one. 
the ~ss blatant than Protagoras, other justices have used actual public opinion to measure 
id ~ath penalty's constitutionality. For example, the majority in Atkins purported to 
in enttfy a discernable consensus against executing mentally retarded offenders by relying 
trrkrt on the mom~~tum of public opinion. Ostensibly reportin~ events,_ ~ut _in reali~y 
readJ to effect abohtl~n _by changing attitudes, po~sters and ~ea~ng ab?litwmst media 
the Y cooperate sophistically by consciously selectmg and spmnmg their coverage, and 
n report the new "consensus" they so labor to create. 
Vic~Omicide Law Platonists, whatever their opinion about the death penalty, share a con-
Pia Ion that real moral differences exist among killings. The modern consensus that a 
tru nned torture murder is worse than an accidental killing feels like it must have been 
Cri e forever. To Demosthenes 2500 years ago, it felt that way too. Punishing deliberate 
he me but not accidents? "Not only will this be found in the (positive) laws, but nature 
liirseifhas decreed it in the unwritten laws and in the hearts of men" (Guthrie 1962:Vol. 
, at 118). 
so !hese objectively different types of killings deserve different responses not because 
se~;ety says so: Society says so because the types really are different. A Platonist perpetually 
de ch:s further for the real distinctions among homicides that make them more or less 
he servmg of punishment. As did Demosthenes, we look in the unwritten law and the 
arts of men. 
So h. 
and ~ _Ists scoff. Herodotus showed that customs long accepted as absolute, universal 
divm · £ th · · th · di b . _e, were m act local and relative. Many Sophists were a eists or agnostics, eir 
p s ehef In the gods based on the prosperity of the wicked and the sufferings of the just. 
in:r t~e Sophist Critias, religious practice and even the gods themselves were human 
anJntions to keep people in check through their fear of punishment. Whereas the Hebrews 
in _the Greeks during the Homeric age regarded law as immutable because divinely 
spired, the Sophists saw written law as arbitrary, man-made and shifting. 
"u De~ying that moral facts existed apart from popular opinion, Sophists denounced the 
"-~Wfltten law" (Guthrie 1962:Vol. III, at 70). Long denoting basic moral principles, 
"'IIVersali alid I , d . . and Y v , which overruled the positive laws, "unwritten aw now seeme smister 
men · · h · I th acmg m a new democratic environment. Demoqats saw t e wntten aw as e 
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bulwark against tyranny, preventing an exercise of power essentially arbitrary and capricious. 
Written codes ensured isonomia-equal protection of the law-a watchword of the Age. 
There were "two sides to every question"; everybody's opinion at the Assembly and laW 
courts counted. The People were sovereign; their consensus showed up as law. 
When the Supreme Court in Furman in 1972 struck down all state capital punishment 
regimes as arbitrarily and capriciously administered, a plurality identified the juries' 
unguided discretion to choose life or death as the fundamental constitutional flaW· 
Scrambling to meet Furman's constitutional objection, many states enacted detailed, 
written death penalty codes to guide the jury and limit caprice. Some states fully embraced 
the mathematical ideal of Thales and Pythagoras, enacting mandatory death penaltY 
statutes which specified in writing all and only those factors which, once found, would 
result in automatic punishment by death. 
The Court nevertheless invalidated those mandatory death penalty laws. States noW 
must codify aggravating criteria to ensure equal protection and application of the laW· 
Yet they must always leave possible mitigations unwritten. Justice requires mercy, when 
appropriate to the human heart. And mercy, a key component of the death penalty, 
requires the unwritten law. On the other hand, abolitionists denounce "non-statutorY 
aggravators" -unwritten law that may tip the scale in favor of death. 
"Evolving Standards of Decency ... " 
Today, almost everybody on all sides of the death penalty debate embraces another 
sophistic article of faith: Progress. Protagoras especially embraced a progressive vieW of 
human history. In his myth of creation, Zeus sent Hermes to bring humans tWO 
indispensable moral virtues-dike and aidos. Dike is a sense of justice. Aidos, more com-
plicated, is most like conscience-combining shame, modesty, and respect for others. 
Although they were not innate, all people must have these virtues for a community to 
survive (Guthrie 1962:Vol. III, at 66). Thus, Zeus decreed that anyone incapable of 
acquiring these virtues must be put to death, "for he is a plague of the state" (Plato 
1956:322d). Nothing was objective, but certain feelings and attitudes so polluted the com-
munity they mandated death. 
Mores may differ in different societies, and people might change their views, but in 
the long run, human history was progress. All practices and opinions may be equallY 
true, but they were not equally sound. The Sophists were justified in charging peo~ 
money to help substitute views that, once adopted, seemed and therefore were better. 
standards may be variable and changing, but overall they were changing for the better. 
This paradoxical faith in real progress while objective values are denied, comman~S 
the allegiance of the Court today. "Time works changes:' a majority declared in 1910 Jn 
Weems. The cruel and unusual punishment "clause of the Constitution may be therefore 
progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire meaning as public opinion 
becomes enlightened by a humane justice" (at 378). The Eighth "Amendment must draW 
its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society:' Chief Justice Warren declared famously in Trap v. Dulles in 1958 (at 101). por 
the past half century and especially since Furman, the entire Court has been thoroughlY 
Protagorean. Public opinion may shift suddenly and wildly after a particularly egregious 
killing, or after a particularly sympathetic convicted killer is finally executed, but in the 
long term, society can and does progress. The justices unanimously agree that the con-
stitutional meaning of "cruel and unusual" must cause and reflect that progress. 
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gr A~olitionists, such as ]ust~ce Brennan in Furman, tend to see human progress in the 
Asan scheme as the progressive limitation and eventual elimination of the death penalty. 
b a matter of history, advocates find it undeniable that over millennia, punishment has 
tr~~me more and more limited. Retribqtivist advocates also believe in progress. Certain 
and s ma.y be transcendent and timeless, but our understanding of these moral facts, 
by ra.ctt~es that reflect this awareness, do evolve and improve. Platonists, motivated 
sea a h e:,Ief In the possibility of progress and an obligation to achieve it, thus continue to 
an;~ or moral categories that more nearly result in homicides being classified correctly 
ers more nearly getting what they deserve. 
th EFven American constitutional fundamentalists-strict constructionists who embrace e ound ' · · al. in 17 ers ongm mtent-concede that some crimes which brought the death penalty 
of 8~ may not constitutionally do so today. And they also concede that some methods 
be PUUishrnent such as ear cropping, standard at the birth of our Nation, have simply 
corne c 1 d rue an unusual when measured against modern evolving standards of decency. 
we Iiowe.ver starkly Protagoras and Socrates disagreed about whether justice and truth 
sh re ~~h~ely subjective, they both believed in progress and the social compact. Having 
th ar~ In Its formation, citizens must submit to the law, even as they struggle to enlighten 
pr~ tgno~ant to change it. They must obey that product of an evolving, imperfect but 
co g:es~mg consensus. Thus it was, that facing his own execution based upon wrongful 
la~V~tion and sentencing, Socrates refused to escape, blaming his unjust fate not on the 
emselves, but on their faulty administration. 
Pu ~sing the same distinction today, many abolitionists ground their opposition to capital 
wh ~hment on government's inability to administer the penalty fairly, regardless of 
ba ~ er anybody can be said to deserve to die. These opponents, and even some supporters, 
ad c . a.moratorium on executions for as long as it takes to improve the death penalty's 
an rntmstration. Yet, those who would strictly abide by the social compact, having sworn 
op Oath to uphold the Constitution and the law, including public officers personally 
th ~o~ed to the death penalty and private citizens sitting as jurors, ought to subordinate 
oretr Individual opinions to the public consensus as reflected in the law. Through acting 
sanre~training themselves, they should play their part in moving a killer toward State-
so Choned death. At the same time, motivated by a faith in progress-whether toward 
rn rne transcendent pre-existent justice or toward practices popularly regarded as hu-
de~~e-like Socrates, they should remonstrate in the courts and the assemblies, and 
tcate themselves to improving the regime by eliminating the death penalty. 
fro Other abolitionists, however, like the Sophist Antiphon, deny all obligation flowing 
the rn the social compact. Since positive law is arbitrary and capricious, the plaything of 
With~~re powerful. a_nd .Pe~suasive, a person may vio~ate . the law when he ca? get away 
whil · Some. abohtwmst JUdges and jurors share thts view, and would nulhfy the law 
tim e pretendmg to apply it. Abolitionist prosecutors do the same. For example, long-
dea:h .Manhattan dist.rict attorney Robert Morgenthau dec~~red tha~ he ":ould seek th~ 
Nev penalty accordmg to the New York Penal Law2s in the appropnate circumstances. 
nev:rtheless, however heinous a murder or murderer may be, the appropriate circumstances 
l'h r arose. Such covert disobedience violates the oath of office and the lesson of Socrates. 
th e greater obligation is to submit to the law all the while openly attempting to persuade e auth · · ' 
lllod ortties of their mistake. The responsible capital defense counsel, too, ad?pts. that 
el. But those who proclaim a faith in democracy, while they undermme It by --=--~~sll. New York's death-penalty law enacted in 1995 was declared unconstitutional in People v. 
a e (2004). ' ' 
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substituting their own personal convictions for the consensus of the moment, may appeal 
to a consensus in a larger world. Whether world public opinion should inform the Eighth 
Amendment bitterly divides the U.S. Supreme Court. A majority in the United States 
may support the death penalty today, abolitionists insist, but a united European Union 
and Canada have abolished it, in every instance in the teeth of overwhelming public 
support for its retention. 26 
Individuals thus can justify civil disobedience, as Antiphon himself did, by disparaging 
local convention in favor of a cosmopolitan, universal human dignity. The Greeks debated 
whether slavery should be abolished as inhumane, and many abolitionists believe that 
their campaign is a continuation of a crusade against slavery. The belief that universal 
laws of nature override local conventions can fuel a death penalty advqcate's or abolitionist's 
genuine commitment to transcendent human dignity. But it had a brutal form historically, 
and still does today. 
Surrounded by the Athenians and desperately trying to stay free and neutral in the war 
between Athens and Sparta, the inhabitants of the small island of Melos pled for justice 
with the Athenian representatives sent to convince them to submit. "Justice depends upon 
the equality of power to compel;' Thucydides reports the Athenian representatives as 
warning. "In fact, the strong do what they can; the weak accept what they must." Forget 
justice: "What is looked for is a preponderance of power in action" (Thucydides 1954:358-
365). Callicles, the Sophist, scorned Socrates, insisting on the natural right of the strong 
to dominate the weak. This most selfish view, that the powerful rightfully dominate 
whenever they can, animates many murderers today, who see their own crimes an~ 
society's punishment as equal proof that the only real law is "the law of the jungle. 
Everyone does what they can get away with, or else dies in the attempt. 
Cynics-they called themselves Realists then, and now-see the death penalty regi.JlleS 
as more proof of this philosophy. Legislatures, the People's representatives, supposedlY 
have enacted neutral death penalty statutes to be applied by prosecutors and judges, 
equally to all. In his famous funeral oration, Pericles declared that in Athens, "Everybo~Y 
is equal before the law." The United States claims a commitment to world leadership 10 
continuing that humanistic tradition of equal protection of the law: Social status must 
be divorced from legal rights. 
Sure. 
Any class-based death penalty, any racist death penalty violates not only human dignitY• 
but also our commitment to equality before the law. In the United States, many capital 
defendants still do not have competent investigatory, trial and appellate counsel, although 
more and more leading law firms supply topnotch abolitionist counsel pro bono in capital 
cases. But the core commitment to equality before the law must go deeper than improved 
counsel and increased funding for the process. Isonomia also attaches to how we dejirte 
capital murder-its substance also can be infected with race or class bias. 
Our roots, Biblical and secular, demand an emphatic commitment to equality under 
law, from the definition of capital murder to its punishment by death. Whether frorn the 
command of Leviticus to "love thy neighbor as thyself," or the rejection of a blood price, 
26. Cf, Steiker (2002). European abolitionists use a Protagorean defense that while all opin!ons 
are equally true, some are better than others. Elitists, claiming to be democrats, and their Amenc:~ 
disciples, insist that society does better without a death penalty. Thus, these "representatives" take 1 
upon themselves to shape public opinion, confident that the People will eventually embrace the 
abolition forced upon them. 
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or injun f · h · · Lik c Ions m om1c1de law to treat slave and freeman equally, the message is clear: 
b e cases must be treated alike; and different cases treated differently. All persons must 
he trea~ed equally. Equal treatment-isonomia-is an ideal at the very core of western 
p~anism. If we fail to reflect this essential egalitarianism in the definition, detection, 
de~~c.ution, . and punishment of murder, we only will have confirmed Thrasymachus' 
pe alitJon of JUstice as "the interest of the stronger." Transcendent or progressing, our death 
o:I ty must never arbitrarily divide homicide into more or less egregious types that reflect 
Y the desires of the dominant, with power and money to impose on the rest. 
''On the Impulse of the Moment" 
Wa Socr~tes squared off against the Sophists. Whereas the Sophists saw a world where all 
of~ ~bitrary, relative, and subjective, Socrates insisted on absolute objective values capable 
''!" emg known, but very difficult to put into practice. As Guthrie observes, Socrates 
calVed and went to his death in the conviction that the moral problem: 'What am I to do?' 
of:nft ?,e adequately answered without an antecedent knowledge of objective standards 
a ue (Guthrie 1962:Vol. III, at 328, n.2). 
Tod · c . 
and ay, Intor~ed death penalty reformists who pursue moral refinements m substance 
ernb~rocess whd~ they administer the ultimate punishment in a de~ply flawed s~stem, 
..... hace Socrates amalgam of humility about substance and also his confidence m the 
"•et od Lik S th of h · e ocrates, we first collect instances that almost all would agree are e worst 
ch t e Worst. Next, we examine these cases to find common qualities, or the essential 
e)( ara.ct.eristics they share. Socrates, with Plato and Aristotle, maintained that after 
in~llli~mg enough particular instances, the human mind had an innate, intuitive ability 
qu:·ctiVely to divine their common essence (Guthrie 1962:Vol. III, at 429). T~is common 
th Ity or nexus of common qualities- "the one thing said of them all, runmng through 
ern all · h all " h · form . ' In t em , that by which they are all the same -wast e1r nature, essence, 
' Idea (Guthrie 1962:Vol. III, at 432). 
Pe The Supreme Court has upheld this methodology in Furman and its progeny, and re-
"o~~edly demanded that state legislatures guide jury discretion over life and death by 
P Je~tJve" categories-aggravators distinguished and defined in advance - capable in ractJce fb · · · all 1 d d or d 0 emg apphed so as to ensure punishment proportiOn y corre ate to esert 
eterrence. 
''k.i~~llle aggravating circumstances, such as "in the course of and furtherance of robbery," 
~n~ mo:; ~h.an on~ victim," "endangering several othe~ persons at the time ?f t.he 
fa g, and killmg while serving a life sentence" may be precise and provable by obJective 
sucths. But mental states or attitudes which can deservedly make a killer death-eligible, 
c as "ext h lie '"' ld al ul d Pre . reme recklessness with a depraved indifference to uman te, co , c c ate , 
..... meditated:' and "especially heinous atrocious and cruel," are equally real and morally ·••ore 1 , , . 
ag re evant, despite their fuzzy boundaries. Just because we can hst and define an 
rn grav~t~r objectively and distinctly-because we can apply it consistently-hardly 
eans It 'fi . tl h . d Peatedly JUst! es making a killer death-eligible. Furthermore, as Ans~o. e e~p ha~1ze r~-
sc· ' we cannot discover nor should we demand the same preciSIOn m et ICS as Ill 
Ience. 
tra~~hough Plato proposed a homicide code which in substance went well beyond the 
w
0 
~tiona} distinctions of intentional, negligent, accidental, and justifiable killings, he 
Pr u d have continued ancient and traditional practices, such as the dying victim's 
erogative to pardon the killer (Plato 1978:868), and most emphatically, blood pollution, 
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which he saw attaching automatically at the moment of the slaying. Because of the victim'S 
"distract[ed) soul;' Plato would continue to deny parole forever to any killer who fled 
before trial. If the alleged killer stayed, anybody could prosecute, and if found guilty, "~e 
convicted offender shall be put to death, and shall not receive burial in the land of hiS 
victim" (Plato 1978:865d-e, 87ld). 
Parricide was the most "purely wicked homicide" imaginable to Plato. Any son otherwi~e 
tempted to commit such an act should be terrified by that "tale-or doctrine-call it 
what you please;' that "there is a justice watching to avenge a kinsman's blood, and · · · 
that he who has dealt in such guilt shall infallibly be done by as he has done" (Plato 
1978:872c-e). This mythological form of divine retribution remarkably resembled the 
Old Testament's-as it was done, so shall it be done, in this world or the next. For Plato, 
this was "truth ... firmly believed by those who occupy themselves with such matters · · · 
that vengeance is taken on such crimes beyond the grave, and when the sinner has returned 
to our own world once more, he must infallibly pay nature's penalty-must be done by 
as he did-and end the life he is now living by the like violence at another's hand" (Plato 
1978:870d-e). 
What should we do to the worst of all non-believers-undeterred by "the dread of 
vengeance from heaven"- a son who contrives and deliberately slays his own father to 
inherit more quickly? The "magistrates shall put him to death," urges Plato, then "cast 
him out naked, outside the city at an appointed place," where "all the magistrates, in the 
name of the State, shall take each man his stone and cast it on the head of the corpse as 
in expiation for the State" (Plato 1978:873a-b ). The body was not to be buried. This rnost 
extreme punishment, this collective ritual expression of extreme disgust, was inflicted on 
the killer's body only after execution, much like the Old Testament's hanging after death· 
Even here, however, there must be no torture. Certain punishments were simply too cruel 
and unusual, however heinous the crime. 
The same penalty the Lord rejected for Cain as too painful in Genesis-being exiled 
at the perpetual mercy of hostile forces- Plato too, rejected: "For no offense whatsoever 
shall any man be made a hopeless outlaw, not even though he have fled beyond our 
borders. Death, prison, stripes, ignominious postures of sitting or standing . . . fines--
these shall be our punishments" (Plato 1978:85Sc). 
Essentially continuing traditional practices and punishments, Plato greatly refine~ 
homicide law substantively, by classifying killers according to their motives and rn~nt d 
states. Anticipating today's aggravator, "killing from a pecuniary motive," Plato idennfie 
greed as "the chief source of the most aggravated charges of willful homicide." Also no tinS 
"the spirit of rivalry with its brood of jealousies and dangerous company;' Plato anticipated 
today's "gang related" and "drug related" capital murders. His classification of killing corn· 
mitted from "craven and guilty terrors;' especially motivated by fear that another person 
will expose past, private misdeeds, presaged today's "killing a witness" aggravator. ;.. 
person who ordered a killing was, for Plato, nearly as guilty as the assassin; he was to be 
executed, but allowed to be buried in his native land. Plato's proposed homicide cod~ 
was designed not for an ideal world but for this one-not for heroes, but for "slipS 0 
humanity" (1978:853c). 
The Laws became most nuanced when Plato distinguished two types of intentional 
but passion-driven homicides: "It is an act of passion when a man is done away with on 
the impulse of the moment, by blows or the like, suddenly and without any previoUS 
purpose to kill, and remorse instantly follows on the act. It is also an act of passion when 
a man is roused by insult in words or dishonoring gestures, pursues his revenge, and ends 
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by taking I'£ . h 
1978. a I e Wit purpose to slay and without subsequent remorse for the deed" (Plato 
·866d-e) (emphasis added) . 
an:~r Was a spur of the moment passion killing where the actor "lost it" for a moment 
insuJinsta?~Y regretted it, as bad as the "slow burn" passion boiling and bubbling from 
Thes t o: 1?Jur.y which ripened into a plan to kill and satisfaction after at its execution. 
e distmctwns made a moral difference, differing in degree and consequence. · 
1\m.~h~ Old Testament used the defendant's anger as proof of premeditated intent. Anglo-
but r~an common law treated an intentional killing committed in "the heat of passion," 
de£ 
0 
d Y 0~ a "sudden quarrel," as manslaughter and therefore not death-eligible. If the 
en ants p . " I d" "del'b , asswn coo e even for an instant, if he showed he could calculate or 
rna 
1 
tate about anything, the killing was no longer passionate and the crime no longer 
ns aughter, but murder and deserving of death (King v. Oneby 1727:465). 
of ~ut ~l~to had not been so sure: "I take it we cannot treat these as two distinct forms 
Part:1c.Ide; both may fairly be said to be due to passion and to be partially voluntary, 1 Y Involuntary." On the other hand: 
The man who nurses his passion and takes his revenge not at the moment and 
~n the spot, but afterward and of set purpose, resembles the deliberate murderer. 
~ Who does not bottle up his wrath but expends it all at once, on the spot, 
Without premeditation, is like the involuntary homicide; still we cannot say that 
~~en he is altogether an involuntary agent, though he is like one. Hence the 
. Ifficulty of deciding whether homicides of passion should be treated in law as 
Intent' al . . . b) IOn or, m some sense, unmtentwnal (Plato 1978:866e-867 . 
"si Not U~til 1980 did the New York Court of Appeals catch up with Plato, holding that 
to :menng" emotional disturbance, no less than explosive rage, could mitigate murder 
anslaughter (People v. Casassa 1980). 
sor~la~o had pressed on. Distinctions were real. They should be recognized. "[C]lass each 
the 0~th that which it resembles," the Athenian declares, "discrimi~~~ng the one from wh er by the presence or absence of premeditation and legally visitmg the slaughter 
ere ther . d' . . . hil th wh · h . e Is preme 1tat10n as well as angry feeling with a severer sentence w e at 
a lll~d 18 committed on the spur of the moment and without purpose aforethou~ht with 
that e~ sentence. That which is like the graver crime should receive the graver pumshment, 
and ~hich ~esembles the lighter, a lighter (Plato 1978:867b-c). For Plato objectively graver 
ess senous crimes deserved more or less serious punishment. 
Pu ~ristotle went further. Every moral question including the justice of death as n1shm . . . . ' d that ent, necessanly mvolved emotiOns. "It IS easy to get angry-anyone can o 
the : · · but to feel or act towards the right person to the right extent at the right time for 
19s~~ght reason in the right way-that is not easy, and not everyone can do it" (Aristotle 
.1109a). 
wh Ar~stotle repeatedly warned that precision was impossible: "It is not easy to determine 
Ion;~, 18 ~e right way to be angry, and with whom, and on what grounds, and for ?ow 
child (Aristotle 1953:1126a). Should society be angry at rapists who murder and mutilate 
ren? H "Wh · h · ht to b · ow angry? Why? For how long? And most important, at IS t e ng way 
iu.r· e ~gry?" These challenges confront legislatures in establishing punishments, and also 
Ies In d 'di ec1 ng between life and death in particular cases. 
A.t the al th th killin' · not ~en ty phase of a capital trial, the defense typically argues at e g IS 
Un ;:flect.J.ve of the defendant's character. Aristotle saw passion killings as a particularly 
te Iable basis on which to judge character: "All acts due to temper or any other of the 
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unavoidable and natural feelings to which human beings are liable . . . are injuries; but 
this does not of itself make them unjust or wicked men, because the harm that they did 
was not due to malice; it is when a man does a wrong on purpose that he is unjust and 
wicked" (Aristotle 1953:1135). "A man may lie with a married woman .. . under the 
influence of passion. Then although his conduct is unjust, he is not an unjust man; I 
mean that the act of stealing does not make a man a thief, nor the act of adultery make 
him an adulterer; and similarly in all other cases" (Aristotle 1953: 1134a, emphasis added). 
A person who has killed another does not thereby become "a killer." His conduct-an 
act and its accompanying mental state-was murder; yet his character may not be that 
of a murderer. What a person does is not necessarily who he is. Deliberate "choice," 
observes Aristotle wisely, "seems ... a more reliable criterion for judging character than 
actions are" (Aristotle 1953:llllb ). 
Plato and Aristotle counted the actor's intent and motive in deciding his moral blame-
worthiness. But outcomes do not always match intentions. What if the would-be murderer 
failed in his purpose, and his victim, although wounded, fortunately survived? Plato 
wrestled with the perennial challenge of balancing intent and harm, including hoW to 
respond to offenses such as attempted murder and assault with the intent to kill. "If anyone 
intend and purpose the death of a person with whom he is on friendly terms, he wh.o 
wounds but fails to kill with such intent deserves no mercy, and shall be made to stand h!S 
trial for homicide with as little scruple as though he had killed" (Plato 1978:876e-877a). 
Do we do to him as he has done, or as he would have done? Is attempted murder as 
bad as murder? Was Kant correct that the only purely evil thing is an evil will? Or should 
the would-be murderer get the benefit of the victim's good luck? These questions continue 
to plague us. The Supreme Court would almost certainly find the death penalty dispro-
portionate for attempted murder, even for a would-be mass-murdering terrorist like the 
shoe-bomber who was only prevented from blowing up an airplane full of people by the 
last moment interference of alert passengers and crew. 
Uncharacteristically irrational, Plato, too, would credit the lucky: "The law will shoW 
its reverence for his ... propitious fortune .. . which has, in mercy to both wounder and 
wounded, preserved the one from a fatal hurt and the other from incurring a curse and 
disaster. It will show its gratitude and submission ... by sparing the criminal's life and 
dooming him to lifelong banishment to the nearest state, where he shall enjoy his revenues 
in full" (Plato 1978:877a-b). 
Attitude counts, but so does luck. Death is different. 
((If We Know Anything We Know This .. :' 
"The most indisputable of all beliefs," Aristotle called it: "Contradictory statements 
are not at the same time true." The law of non-contradiction is the most elementary law 
of logic. A thing cannot be and not be in the same sense at the same time (Aristot~e 
1941:1005b). "Our jurisprudence and logic have long since parted ways;' Justice Scalia 
bemoaned. The law cannot require and prohibit the same practice at the same time 
(Walton v. Arizona 1990:657, 663). 
Is the Supreme Court's whole modern death penalty jurisprudence self-contradictory? 
Consider its well known outlines through the prism of ancient antagonism. 
"You are entirely free to act according to your own judgment, conscience and absolut~ 
discretion," ~cGautha's jury had been instructed. Beyond life or death, "the law itsel 
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~vides no standard for (your] guidance" (McGautha v. California 1971:183). The Supreme 
d' urt ?eld in McGautha that it did not violate due process for states to give juries "absolute 
~scretiOn" to decide life or death. There was no real alternative to standardless discretion, 
foe ~aj?rity declared: "No formula is possible that would provide a reasonable criterion 
R. r t e Infinite variety of circumstances that may affect the gravity of murder" (citing 
a~J:U Comm~ssio~ on Capital Punishment§ 595). It was simply, "beyond present human 
wh·I% · · · to Identify before the fact characteristics of homicides and their perpetrators 
infiic. call for the death penalty." The flux and flow of different circumstances, their 
is n~te complexity made every killing different. Situations do not repeat; every person 
d' UOiq.ue. "The very antithesis of due process," the dissent called this same standardless 
IscretiOn· " th' th " ' no mg more an government by whim (at 250). 
ag 'fhe next year, Furman v. Georgia (1972) reversed course and ushered in the modern 
ha e ~f capital pu~i~hment by striking down as "cruel and un~sual". the death penalties 
an~ azardly admmistered across the United States. Absolute discretiOn allowed for race 
th class bias (p. 248, opinion of Douglas, J.), and produced arbitrariness resulting in 
St e execution of a "capriciously selected random handful" (pp. 309-310, opinion of 
S~wart, J.). In Furman, the Supreme Court demanded of death penalty law in the United 
to tes what Pythagoras had demanded of the kosmos: that it impose limits on the unlimited 
en;ake .the limited. That there be proportional punishment based on rational criteria, 
cted In advance. 
Re · on th actmg to Furman, the states adopted structured death penalty statutes, based largely 
th S e Model Penal Code. Four years later, the first post-Furman death sentences reached 
d' e u~reme Court: "The Georgia legislature has plainly made an effort to guide the jury's 
f:screhon, while at the same time permitting the jury to dispense mercy on the basis of 
b ctors too intangible to write into a statute, and (we] cannot accept ... that the effort is 
1~~~d to f~,il," three justices concurred, upholding the ~ew sta.te statute ( ~reg_g v. ,?eor~ia 
St ·221) · Furman mandates . . . discretion must be smtably drrected and limited, Justice 
q~:art said for the plurality (~t 189). Georgia, ~lorida, and ~exas ~ad sat.is~ed that re-
lllent. A state could have It both ways-limited aggravatiOn with unlrrmted mercy. 
d A.t the same time it upheld states' "guided discretion" legislation, the Court struck 
a~~n lllandatory death penalties. Death could not be imposed ~ut~matic~y, eve~ for 
d' g avated murder (Woodson v. North Carolina 1976). The Constitution reqUired guided 
Iscreti M . . k . ( 19 on.. andatory death penalties gave sentencers no discretiOn at all. Loc ett v. Ohw 
h ~~~) built upon Woodson's constitutional demand for "particularized consideration," 
aso Ing that a jury "may not be precluded from considering as a mitigating factor any 
u ~ect of a defendant's character" (at 304). Lest mercy be prevented, "respect due to the 
~queness of the individual" (at 304) forbade defining mitigating circumstances 
austively in advance. 
"1' 
d' he Court has now completed its about-face since Furman," complained Justice White, 
Issentin . L k " c h b' , Co . g m oc ett (at 631) . Allowing the defendant to offer any tact, owever Izarre, 
it ,~Plamed Justice Rehnquist, "will not eliminate arbitrariness but codify and institutionalize 
· n short, the new jurisprudence was "incoherent" (at 629). 
b Two streams of cases flowed from Furman. Gregg and its progeny required consistency, 
'f~d on aggravators clearly defined by the legislature and regularly applied in practice. 
Co e ?ther line of cases, based on Woodson and Lockett, required that each offender be 
d nsi~ered individually, as a concrete but complex, unique human being. Together, these 
Octnne d · · · ' b I di t' As s ~eeme srmultaneously to prohibit and yet requrre a JUry sa so ute sere IOn. 
a lllatter of basic logic, "at least one of these judicially announced irreconcilable 
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commands must be wrong;' Scalia insisted (Walton v. Arizona 1990:673). Was the jury's 
discretion to decide life or death limited, or not? Surely it could not be both. Aristotle 
had laid our logical foundations: "The same attribute cannot at the same time belong 
and not belong to the same subject and in the same respect." This was "the most certain 
of all principles. If we know anything, we know this" (Aristotle 1941:1005b). 
Purportedly then, the Court's modern Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has been 
built on two core values-consistency and fairness. However, consistency-essentiallY 
treating like cases alike and ensuring equality before the law-clashed directly with fair-
ness-treating every human being as a unique individual and recognizing that the measure 
of a person is more than a single act. Heraclitus may have delighted in contradiction and 
the simultaneous truth of opposites, but Heraclitean "logic" was to Aristotle what the 
d" Supreme Court's jurisprudence is to Scalia and like-minded critics - simply "absur 
(Walton v. Arizona 1990:667). 
The Court "has completely exploded whatever coherence the notion of'guided discretion' 
once had;' Justice Scalia complained (Walton v. Arizona 1990:661). The basic doctrine of 
the whole post-Furman era rested on illogic-a "simultaneous pursuit of contradictorY 
objectives" (at 667). The entire show was nothing more than a "jurisprudence containing 
the contradictory commands that discretion to impose the death penalty must be limited 
but discretion not to impose it must be unconstrained" (at 668). 
"This Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is not so patently irrational that it 
should be abruptly discarded," Justice Blackmon countered weakly, for four dissenting 
Justices in Walton, damning death penalty logic with faint praise (at 680). Four years later 
in 1994, near the end of his career, Blackmon himself was finally driven over the edge 
(Callins v. Collins 1994). 
Accumulating evidence from the modern era finally convinced him that a death penaltY 
could never be "at once consistent and principled but also humane and sensible to the 
uniqueness of the individual;' as the Court previously had demanded (Eddings v. Oklahoma 
1982:110). The Court's modern jurisprudential contradiction could never be reconciled 
in practice.27 To chase the problem "down one hole" -whether fairness or consistency-
was to force it out the other. This irrationality released Justice Blackmon's long-standing 
deep-seated personal revulsion at the death penalty. Now at long last, when his 
understanding had finally caught up to his feelings, the Justice could famously proclaim= 
"From this day forward I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death" ( Callins 11• 
Collins 1994: 1130). Justice Scalia publicly welcomed his new ally into the logical fold, 
joining "those of us who have acknowledged the incompatibility of the Court's Furman 
and Lockett-Eddings lines of jurisprudence" (at 1128). 
If the whole modern death penalty jurisprudence did rest on self-contradictory logical 
foundations and therefore was impossible in practice, the jurisprudence if not the dea~ 
penalty itself must be discarded. Rather than continuing to "coddle the Court's delusion, 
Justice Blackmun would have abolished the death penalty as unconstitutional ( Callins 11• 
Collins 1994:1130). Justice Scalia, on the other hand, would abandon the entire "Woodson-
Lockett" line of reasoning. Fairness would no longer be constitutionally guaranteed; 
mandatory death penalty schemes without individualized attention to the murderer's 
character would be permitted. A constitutional fundamentalist, Justice Scalia would rest 
27. "Experience has taught us that the Constitutional goal of eliminating arbitrariness and dis-
crimination from the administration of death can never be achieved without compromising an equallY 
essential component of fundamental fairness-individualized sentencing'' (Callins v. Collins 1994:1129, 
Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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nsprudence of death on consistent, solid if inhumane, logical foundations: "If it is 
n(~ [unusual] then the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit it, no matter how cruel" 
alton v. Arizona 1990:670). 
The assault on the logical "machinery of death;' begun by Justices Marshall and Brennan, 
now championed by Scalia and Blackmun, demanded rebuttal. More than any other 
llle~ber of the Supreme Court in the modern era, Justice Stevens upheld the logic of 
capital jurisprudence founded on fairness and consistency. Upholding Georgia's death 
Penal~ regime as a model in Zant v. Stephens ( 1983), Stevens adopted the state supreme 
c~~rt s ~~alysis of its own statute: Georgia law was a pyramid which contained "all cases 
~ omicide of every category." The punishment became more severe as one moved "from 
e base to the apex, with the death penalty applying only to those few cases which are 
contain d . th . th e m e space JUSt beneath the apex. To reach that category a case must pass 
rough three planes of division" (at 871). 
t The first plane separated the murderers from lesser homicides such as reckless manslaugh-
t er,fi acc~dental killings, and self-defense. Here "the function of the trier of facts is limited 
[;
0 
ndmg facts." The second plane separated out the death-eligibles. Again, a jury as 
~ctfinder must find aggravating factors previously defined by statute. And "the third 
fh ane se~arates from all cases in which . .. death may be imposed, those cases in which it 
b ~ll be unposed. There is an absolute discretion in the factfinder to place any given case 
1 ~ ow the plane and not impose death" (Walton v. Arizona 1990:717, citing Zant v. Stephens 83:871, emphasis added) . 
h In short, consistency could be demanded at the stage of death-eligibility; fairness, 
t o~ever, required absolute discretion in the actual selection of a sentence of life or death 
Sor Individual murderers. The scheme involved one "final limitation." The Georgia 
a ?reme Court trumpeted itself as the last great insurance of consistency against 
; Itrariness. Reviewing each jury's exercise of discretion in the automatic appeal, the 
: ~te's high court would decide whether the death penalty was "imposed under the 
n uence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor; whether the statutory ag-
gravaf · ' · h h h d ~ng Circumstances are supported by the evidence; and w et er t e sentence of 
S eath Is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases" (Zant v. 
tephens 1983:872). 
S Justice Marshall, in dissent, had scoffed at this notion. "Under today's decision all the 
tate has to do is require the jury to make some threshold finding. Once that finding is 
:?e, the jurors can be left completely at large, with nothing to guide them but their 
P Ims and prejudices" (Zant v. Stephens 1983:910, dissenting opinion). Georgia's death 
enalty structure made "an absolute mockery" of Furman (at 910) . 
"T 




884). "There can be no perfect procedure," as Justice Rehnquist had declared (at 
v· 4). But because death was qualitatively different from all other punishment, "It is of 
thital importance to the defendant and to the community that any decision to impose e death th th · · " 
( sentence be and appear to be based on reason ra er an capnce or emotiOn at 885). ' 
h Although sharply disagreeing on the constitutionality of the death penalty and the co-
Geren~e of the logic which supported it in Zant, Justice Marshall, Justice Stevens, and the 
fo:org,~ ~upr~me Court all rejected emotion as irrational and thoroughly inapp~opriate 
ti decidmg life or death. That fatal legal decision, all sides agreed, must be entirely ra-
s ~nal- the product of rational categories clearly defined and accurately applied. Otherwise, 
aid Marshall, it was "mere prejudice and whim" (Zant v. Stephens 1983:910). 
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Furman outlawed caprice and demanded "guided discretion;' thus requiring every state 
with a death penalty to impose limits on the unlimited to make the limited. By insisting 
that individual persons are unique and forbidding an exhaustive list of mitigating factors, 
the Lockett-Eddings line of decisions effectively outlawed Socrates' program of collecting 
instances, then finding the common essence, and categorizing exhaustively in advance 
all and only those who deserve to die. We could not step in the same situation twice for 
new characters and fresh facts flow on. Pythagoras or Heraclitus? Justice Scalia demanded 
in effect: One or the other (and possibly neither)-but not both. 
In a world that strictly limits logic to non-emotional rationality, Scalia's scathing attack 
seems persuasive. Choosing between life and death, after all, involves only a single decision. 
The Court cannot logically command unlimited discretion not to impose death and at the 
same time insist on limited discretion to impose the death penalty. X -limited discretion--
cannot be both true and false, commanded and prohibited, in the same sense at the same 
time. If examined through a strictly limited rational lens, the modern era's death penalty 
jurisprudence-at once demanding and reconciling fairness and consistency, a Heraclitean 
tension of irreconcilable warring opposites-does appear internally incoherent. 
Rejecting emotion as irrational and unlawful, defenders of the Court's current death 
penalty jurisprudence are hamstrung: "The size of the class may be narrowed to reduce 
sufficiently that risk of arbitrariness," declared Justice Stevens valiantly, "even if a jury is 
then given complete discretion to show mercy when evaluating the individual characteristiCS 
of the few individuals who have been found death-eligible" (Walton v. Arizona 1990:716). 
But could "showing mercy" and "evaluating" a person's character be accomplished strictlY 
rationally by applying general criteria? 
The "final stage" or penalty phase of a capital trial is "significantly different" from the 
guilt phase, concurred Justice Rehnquist in Zant. The jury at sentencing "makes a uniqu~ 
individualized judgment regarding the punishment that a particular person deserves 
(Zant v. Stephens 1983:900). 
All supporters of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this modern era demand fairness 
and consistency. Retributivist supporters of the death penalty especially need to shoW 
how both core values can be respected simultaneously-how we can generally treat like 
cases alike and at the same time act on the uniqueness of each particular case. We need 
a special kind of justice that can give us fairness and consistency, and we need a language 
rich enough to meet that challenge. 
Heraclitus and Pythagoras, Plato and Aristotle show us the way. 
Pythagoras' proof of incommensurability had exploded his own philosophy that rationality, 
discreteness, and proportionality underlay the kosmos, and formed a well-ordered whole. 
Real numbers are not all rational. The guilt phase narrows the class of death-eligible offenders 
rationally, factually, according to general criteria. The sentencing phase, however, assesses 
more than guilt-more than conduct, it measures character. In deciding between life and 
death, we need an incommensurably richer language to express, and a particular non-
rational human faculty of moral intuition to measure, character and desert. 
Because the debate during the modern era of the death penalty has taken place alrno.st 
exclusively on a rational plane, it has failed to use real but non-rationallanguage to explalll 
the particular justice of desert. Without emotion we are trapped in "Flatland."28 It maY 
28. Edwin Abbott, a mathematician, wrote the charming parable Flatland, in which the charac-
ters - circles, squares, and triangles all live on a plane, disparaging the points who live in only on,~ 
dimension. A sphere visits from Spaceland and lifts up a circle from the plane to get a sense of "up · 
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:o~~d mystical, new age, and eccentric to insist that rationality, reason, proportionality, 
n 
1 
Issues of fact do not, and cannot exhaust the inquiry. Although the discovery of a 
rea langua " bl " · h h · tl" ti £ ge unuttera y nc er t an the ratiOnal was star mg or Pythagoras, the need 
or a. concept of justice that transcends general consistency to reconcile it with the defendant's 
~~rticul~r humanity was neither new age nor mystical to Aristotle, the rationalist, nor to 
ato, his teacher. 
£ "Law can never issue an injunction binding on all which really embodies what is best 
o~e~ch," Plato declared in the Statesman; "it cannot prescribe with accuracy what is best 
~ JUst for each member of the community at any one time. The differences of human 
;~o~~ty, the variety of men's activities, and the restless inconstancy of all human affairs 
(PI e It Impossible [to] issue unqualified rules holding good on all questions at all times" 
ato l957:294b). 
d ~eath "is the one punishment that cannot be prescribed by a rule of law:' Justice Stevens 
n ec ~red (without citing Plato), arguing unsuccessfully at the time that only juries and 
dot JUdges in capital trials could be constitutionally entrusted with the decision of life or 
~~th (Spaziano v. Florida 1984:469). The death penalty, Stevens insisted, was "ultimately 
h erstood only as an expression of the community's outrage-its sense that an individual 
S as lost his moral entitlement to live" (at 469). A community's "outrage" -its "moral ense" . J . -must be more than a strictly rational measurement, but this was as close as 
nUstice Stevens came to explicitly acknowledging the richer realm of real informed emotion 
ecessary for capital justice. 
theT~~ Court has .by and large united to imprison itself on a ration.al plane. D_istr~sting 
b Citizenry, feanng that hatred cannot be bridled and once admitted must mevitably 
e Urst. into uncontrollable prejudice and blind rage, the Court has sought to suppress 
0~hon ent~rely. The dead victim's family are allowed their grief ~nd p~blic so~nd bites 
d . ry. A gnm detached rationality is expected of the rest of us, mcludmg the JUry that 
eCides the killer's fate. 
in In McGautha, where the majority affirmed "standardless discretion:' the trial judge had 
lll:~:ucte~ the jury that "[you] may be influenced by pity . .. and you may ~e go;erne~ by 
inclu sentime~t and sympathy" (McGautha v. California 19~1:189). Absolu~e discretiOn mi~ht 
g de anythmg. Yet, McGautha's jury was warned, the law does forbid you from bemg 
\voverned by mere conjecture, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling" (at 189). But that 
v. ~r~re-Furman. Post-Furman, there was no place for e~otion in the_law: So in ~a~ifor~ia 
0 d wn ( 1987), the Supreme Court allowed a judge to mstruct a capital Jury deciding life 5;
9 
eath, .that ~ey must not be "swayed by mere sentiment, ... srn:pathy, or pass~on" (at 
i ). Justice 0 Connor, attempting to resolve the conflict between frurness and consistency, 
ssuedthec ' b" d al " t ourt s new watchword: The death sentence must e a reasone mor response 
0 the e "d " al · · · h CU} a . ;I ence (at 545, concurring opinion). Sentencing was a ~~r .mqm~y mt~, t e 
in ~ bility of the defendant, and not an emotional response to the mitlgatmg eVIdence she 
Sisted (at 545), as if it could ever be moral if it were not also partly emotional. 
"I w·th tis impossible, then, for something invariable and unqualified to deal satisfactorily 
I What is never uniform and constant," Plato had declared (l957:294c). Thus, a "leg-
::--_ 
!:;urning to Flatland, the circle preaches a third dimension, insisting on a language rich enough to 
Sup~~-"up': Pr?clairning a richer reality lands the circle in priso? (~b~o~ 1884). Whil~ the Georgia 
do e Court d1d use the three-dimensional pyramid to explam Jts JUnsprudence, Jt could have 
an~~ so With no loss of meaning by using triangles with bas~s ~nd apexes: Perhaps the more apt 
~1. gy from plane geometry, for Georgia, would be concentnc circles movmg toward the center of 
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isla tor ... in matters of right ... will never be able in the laws he prescribes for the whole 
group to give every individual his due with absolute accuracy" (at 294e-295). Aristotle 
agreed. Like Plato, he revered the law as a rational, consistent application of general rules. 
Yet he too wrestled with its limitations in particular cases of human conduct: "It is obvious 
that to rule by the letter of the law or out of a book is not the best method .. . . On the 
other hand, rulers cannot do without a general principle to guide them; it provides 
something which, being without personal feelings is better than that which by its nature 
does feel. A human being must have feelings; a law has none. Against that one might saY 
that a man will give sounder counsel than law in individual cases. It seems clear then 
that ... laws must be laid down, which shall be binding in all cases, except those in which 
they fail to meet the situation" (Aristotle 1962a:l39, emphasis added). 
Who could know, and how, when rational criteria strictly applied failed to do justice? 
Could rationality alone demonstrate the limits of rationality alone? And when the la~ 
failed, how could people "deal with these undetermined matters to the very best of theJr 
just judgment?" Setting the tone for modern jurisprudence, Aristotle struggled to denY 
emotion: "He who asks Law to rule is asking God and Intelligence and no others to rule; 
while he who asks for the rule of a human being is bringing in a wild beast; for human 
passions are like a wild beast and strong feelings lead astray rulers and the very best of 
men. In law you have the intellect without the passions" (Aristotle 1962a:l43). 
But in the end, there was nowhere else to turn but to human beings - passionate and 
unregulated-for that necessary supplement to "reasonable consistency" which makes true 
moral justice possible. "The advocates of the rule of law do not deny this;' Aristotle conceded, 
"do not suggest that the intervention of a human being in such decisions is unnecessary; 
they merely say that there should be not one person only but many" (Aristotle 1962a:l45). 
Thus, "when the law either will not work at all or will only work badly" in singular instances, 
the power to correct it should not rest with a single person. "As a larger amount of wate~ 
is less easily polluted, so a larger number of people is less easily corrupted than a fe~' 
Aristotle observed, reluctantly admitting an ad hoc decision-making based upon collecuve 
human deliberation inevitably guided by informed emotion. "The judgment of one rnan 
is bound to be warped if he is in a bad temper or has very strong feelings about somethinS· 
But . . . it would take a lot of doing to arrange for all simultaneously to lose their temp~rs 
and warp their judgments" (Aristotle 1962a: 140 ). "A capital sentencing jury representatJV~ 
of a criminal defendant's community assures a 'diffused impartiality,"' Justice Powell agree 
(McCleskey v. Kemp 1987:310, quoting Witherspoon v nlinois 1968:519) (emphasis added)· 
Can we conceive, much less put into practice, an equitable death penalty regime that 
provides "fairness and consistency"? Plato embraced the written law as "the fruit of long eJC-
perience;' and yet imagined "the true Statesman;' who would know when to "allow his activitieS 
to be dictated by his art and pay no regard to written prescriptions. He will do this whenever 
he is convinced that there are other measures which are better" (Plato 1957:300b-c). Tbe 
jury at the guilt phase are like all other citizens, bound strictly by the written law. Once theY 
decide guilt, however, at the sentencing phase, the jury become a "true statesman." With the 
code to guide but not bind them, they are bound to do their best in this particular case. 
Aristotle, ever practical, saw little chance of a true statesman ever emerging in this 
world, but rested his faith ori the jury to approach the ideal as nearly as possibl~- Th~ 
jurors would be empowered to do justice. But justice must transcend the universahsrn ° 
the strictly legal and encompass the infinitely more complex particular human dimension· 
And thus, in the Ethics, Aristotle gave the West "equity"- "neither absolutely identical nor 
generically different" from legal justice (Aristotle 1962b:l137a). "Although both are morallY 
good, the equitable is better of the two" (at 113 7b). 
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th Thu~, fairness did limit consistency: "What causes the problem," said Aristotle, "is that T: equitabl: is not just in the legal sense of'just' but as a corrective of what is legally just. 
e reason IS that all law is universal, but there are some things about which it is not 
Possible to speak correctly in universal terms. Now, in situations where it is necessary to 
s~eak in universal terms but impossible to do so correctly;' we need equity. "So in such a 
Situati . h ' h h 1 . th ?n m w IC t e aw speaks universally, but the case at issue happens to fall outside 
a e u~IVersal formula, it is correct to rectify the shortcoming," Aristotle explained. "Such 
rectification corresponds to what the lawgiver himself would have said if he were present, 
~~d what he would have enacted if he had known of this particular case" (Aristotle 
t 62b: 113 7b). In a democracy the People are the lawgiver. Their legislatures enact general 
:hatutes. And later in court, with a particular capital case befote them, their juries further 
d' ape t?e law. Thus, according to Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas 
t~ssentmg, legislation and jury verdicts should be "the sole indicators ... of decency for 
e purposes of the Eighth Amendment" (Atkins v. Virginia 2002:324). 
[; . Modern death penalty jurisprudence- both equitable and legal-demands and supplies 
. ann_ess and consistency. "That is why the equitable is both just and also better than the 
~Ust In one sense," Aristotle explained. "This is also the reason why not all things are 
alete~mined by law .... For where a thing is indefinite, the rule by which it is measured is 
(:.;.mdefinite [and] shifts with the contour." It is, in short, "adapted to a given situation" 
Istotle 1962b:ll37b). 
h "If this is not a scheme based on 'standardless jury discretion: what is?" Justice Marshall 
cad demanded in Zant (at 906). But at the sentencing phase, has the jury really been "left 
Bompletely at large, with nothing to guide them but their whims and prejudices" (at 910)? 
ecause it will be emotional must it thereby be pernicious and uninformed? 
"In the final analysis, capital punishment rests on not a legal but an ethical judgment-
;~ assessment of what we called in Enmund the 'moral guilt' of the defendant," Justice 
· ~ens had insisted, dissenting in Spaziano. "And if the decision that capital punishment 
~ore appr~p:i~te S<lJolction in extreme cases is justified because ~t expres~es the c_om~uni~s 
foUoal sensib_ility-Its demand that a given affront to humamty re~mr_es retnbutiOn~It 
"al Ws I ~eheve .. . that the life or death decision depends upo~ Its hnk to com~umty 
Ye::s for It_s m~ral and constitutional legitimacy'' (Spaziano v. Flort~a ~984:4~3).29 Eigh~een 
that lat~r, I~ Rmg v. Ariz~na (2002), he finally became part of a maJOrity_ which re~~gruzed 
retnbutiVely, only a JUry could reliably make this moral and emotiOnal dec1Slon.30 
~bolitionists and advocates during our modern era who have fought valiantly to 
~lntain consistency and fairness must understand- must feel- that in that final stage 
er: the jury goes with its gut-moral intuition must be partly emotional. Every moral 
question · 'all · · h d · · I · Is essenti y emotional. Aristotle and Adam Smit , an mcreasmg y m our own -----29 If U . . . b abJ · we are fully to incorporate Aristotle's wisdom and acknowledge that a co ecttve JUry IS etter 
to ~than a single judge to reflect the moral sense of the community, and through its greater numbers 
lilt efeat the unJ·ust effects of extreme eccentric and uninformed passion-then after successive rati ' ' 
for de~ns, when we do reach that final penalty stage, perhaps a vote of eleven-to-one or ten-to-two 
30 th should su~ce (see Blecker 2013:Appendix B). . . . . 
an . · For~ally, Rmg requires only that a jury decide "any fact on wh1ch the leg1slature con~1t10ns 
re ~crease m their maximum punishment" (Ring v. Arizona 2002:589), and does not specifically 
deiUire_that the jury make the final sentencing decision. But if a judge were to decide whether jury-
~fa:r,!Umed aggravating circumstances substantially outweighed mitigating factors, would that mo:al 
or dt not thereby also be covered by Ring? Responding to Ring, states have generally allocated the hfe 
or u:ath decision to juries, but some states reject the insight and still allow judges the final decision 
e or death based on aggravating facts found by a jury. 
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times moral philosophers-both for and against the death penalty- realize this.3 1 We 
should acknowledge the inevitable, and declare legitimate the inescapable role of emotion. 
Mercy and justice require it. 
By its tone, if not by definition, the very measure of desert is partly emotional. Juries 
will err, morally, and condemn to death factually guilty death-eligibles who do not deserve 
to die. As Aristotle reiterated, we cannot expect the same degree of accuracy in moral as 
in scientific questions. But the categories can be narrowed, and the jury can be made to 
feel its responsibility to separate the legal question- is this murder death-eligible?- froJ11 
the moral question-does this murderer deserve to die? Once law and equity are brought 
together, once we explicitly allow informed emotion-moral intuition, that innatelY 
human sense-our jurisprudence on which that condemnation rests becomes explicable 
and coherent. A thing cannot both be and not be in the same sense at the same time. 
Discretion is at once limitless and limited-but in different senses at different times. 
Dissenting in Callins v. Collins, Justice Blackmun went right to the edge of this separate 
dimension: "Prohibiting a sentencer from exercising its discretion to dispense mercy on 
the basis of factors too intangible to write into a statute is offensive to our sense of 
fundamental fairness and respect for the uniqueness of the individual" ( Callins v. CollinS 
1994:1133). But ultimately, he shied away: "The basic question-does the system accuratelY 
and consistently determine which defendants 'deserve' to die?-cannot be answered in 
the affirmative" (at 1130). 
Without intuition and emotion, it cannot be answered at all. 
Dissenting in Walton, Justice Brennan (joined by Marshall) did acknowledge separate 
dimensions, but also failed to acknowledge the emotional and intuitive implications: 
"Lockett and Furman principles speak to different concerns ... the Lockett rule floWS 
primarily from the Amendment's core concern for human dignity, whereas the Furman 
principle reflects an understanding that the Amendment commands that punishment not 
be meted out in a wholly arbitrary and irrational manner" (Walton v. Arizona 1990:676)· 
Applying these cases together leads the Court to "insist that capital punishment be imposed 
fairly, and with reasonable consistency, or not at all"32 (Walton v. Arizona 1990:676, quoting 
Eddings v. Oklahoma 1982:112). 
Legal justice-rule-bound consistency-is what we demand of the jury at the guilt 
phase of a capital trial. Legal discretion must be limited and guided at this stage by well-
defined homicide distinctions, based on mens rea, defenses, affirmative defenses, and other 
factors that can be applied rationally and consistently. But when it comes to the penaltY 
phase, where character and not conduct is the issue, each defendant's unique personalitY 
and background assume center stage. There, we seek fairness: "Equity" - the moral truth, 
based in the jlll'fs intuition- that mysterious rich mix of reason and emotion that combineS 
to determine whether a person really-not merely rationally-deserves to die. 
31. Cf., Pillsbury (1989) for an extended argument along very similar lines. See also essays edited 
by Bandes (1999). 
32. Scalia in Walton also comes close-again without acknowledging the emotional basis fo~ 
moral decision-making: "Since the individualized determination is a unitary one (does this defendallr 
deserve death for this crime?), once one says each sentencer must be able to answer 'no' for whateve 
reason it deems morally sufficient (and indeed for whatever reason any one of 12 jurors deems mora!IY 
sufficient), it becomes impossible to claim that the Constitution requires consistency and rationali~ 
among sentencing determinations to be preserved by strictly limiting the reasons for which eac 
sentencer can say 'yes'" (Walton v. Arizona 1990:656). 
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To Root in a Flowing Stream: Conclusion 
c Pursuing justice today, we drag behind us what sailors call a "sea anchor"- an ancient 
0~re tha~ slows our progress but keeps us steadier, staying our course, even in the midst 
Ph e~otJOnal storms. The Sophists called these essential standards of decency, nomos in 
uJ'sts-deep-seated customs that characterize a culture. "Trials for homicide," Aristotle 
onns us, "were to be conducted according to the ancestral custom"33 (Aristotle 1974:111). 
fee~~estral custom-the past counts: Blood pollutes the land. Many abolitionists may 
co IS, but they have learned to suppress that sentiment as shameful. Because the past 
sh:ts and blo?d pollutes the land, the malevolent killer mu~t suffer. The victim's family 
killer~ave a votce greater than strangers- the victim greater still-but, in the end, the 
s fate deeply concerns the community. 
li ~he essential human punitive impulse cannot be denied, but to do justice it must be 
li:~ted. "Imposing limits on the unlimited to make the limited," Pythagoras teaches. We 
sh ~t the measure of punishment: "Like for like" feels appropriate for starters. "He who 
a ~ 5 the blood of man by man shall his blood be shed," God declares. "The extraordinary 
r:: symmetrical syntax of this great command- (shed-blood-man/man-blood-shed) 
d ~ors _the situation. Action demands an equal and apposite reaction."34 The Pythagoreans 
1 ~6 ~d JUstice, Aristotle tells us, as "suffering that which one has done to another" (Aristotle 
an e
2 ~ 1 l32b). Altho~~~ "Eye for an eye" began as the great limit on ~unis?ment-only 
cr r for an eye-It has been perverted, in common understanding, IntO an act Of 
N Ue ty. Properly understood, it intends to limit the excesses which codes in the ancient 
ll!ear East allowed" (Bailey 1987:50). In the same spirit Deuteronomy demands strictly 
'fh·asured corporal punishment only as deserved, lest the person punished be degraded. 
ish~ sen~e of"appropriate" as like-kind limited punishment, becomes "proportional pun-
ent under the Eighth Amendment. 
Pyt~~Posing limits on th~ unlimited, channeled discretion is the central dem~nd of 
and goras and Furman. Like Socrates, we collect instances and find essences. We discover 
w, cl~arly mark off the continuum of homicide into different degrees of blameworthiness. 
p e ?Uide the jury's discretion by announcing and applying these aggravators, so that 
Unishment will be proportional and only the worst of the worst shall be put to death. 
to ;ubstantively, the decision -life or death- must be morally just. Formally, law aspires 
fro ecome a calculus of categories applied objectively. Life or death would follow demonstrably 
w, m a set of rules applied to a particular act under any given set of circumstances. Ideally, 
tr estern homicide law, like mathematics, would be perfectly cumulative-once established, 
ll!~~:or alw~ys .. Over time, capital crimes and procedures would only be re~ne~ by being 
have dmore limited and precise. In fact, however, homicide and death penal~ Jurispru~ence 
elllb eveloped more like science or chess. Progressively, they have acquired new lines, 
Wisd:aced new understandings and fashions, and occasionally have rejected conv~ntio~al 
ev m as error and returned to ancient roots, which take on new mearung. Over millenrua, 
enasweh · · · d al " · to d ave Jettisoned morally primitive and cultish practices an pen ties, we contmue 
S raw from our ancient homicide law as cultural wellspring. 
ne· ~crates and Jesus were executed. Both prosecutions, however, were political. And 
co It er defendant was tried for murder. Although each was unjustly put to death, neither 
Vi ndemned the death penalty per se. Jesus refused to put up a defense at trial. And Socrates 
~nteered" for death. After being convicted by a bare majority of a 500-person 
~!· Magna Carta guaranteed London its "ancient liberties" without ever specifying what they were. 
· Prof. Murray Lichtenstein in conversation. 
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jury, in a separate penalty phase to determine his fate, after the prosecutor weakly called 
for his death, rather than propose a brief exile, Socrates submitted to that same jury as 
their only alternative his own "just deserts"- a lifetime of free meals in the hall reserved 
for the most honored Olympic athletes. 
Those who followed Socrates sought to give content to the "good" that he had urged 
we seek, but had left undetermined. We adopted the Socratic program, as well as the 
Biblical goal of separating the righteous from the wicked by attempting to give more 
precise content to "evil": Capital killings essentially included the coldly calculated and 
planned, and excluded accidents, negligent and justified killings, and homicides by children 
and the insane. At the extreme, the scheming who kill even their own kin for moneY 
should be destroyed. Also at the extreme are coldly calloused and depraved killings, such 
as the goring ox in the Bible, and before that in the Code of Hammurabi the collapsing 
house badly built. In the 19th century, allowing a horse to run in a crowd exhibited a 
special depravity. Spray shooting into a crowd, the late twentieth century phenomenon, 
setting off a bomb at the Boston Marathon, the current analogue of evil. Among the most 
callous of all, a wealthy pharmacist dilutes chemotherapy for extra profit, not caring 
about the agonies he causes hundreds of trusting cancer patients who rely on his medicine 
to treat their disease. Even absent a specific intent to kill, a wanton recklessness with a 
depraved indifference to human life can be sufficiently heinous to deserve death. 
Before convicting and condemning, we must make most diligent inquiry, as the Bible 
commands, never presuming guilt from accusation, nor accepting its first, superficial a~­
pearances. Homicide is special. The victim's death is a special injury; the killer's death IS 
a special punishment. We commit ourselves to careful, thorough investigation. A 
presumption of innocence attaches from the beginning. Resolving reasonable doubts for 
the defendant, we demand corroboration. Snitch testimony alone should never be enough· 
We owe the accused super due process throughout: We must be morally certain before we 
kill a person. Even after conviction and sentence we will entertain new evidence, and be 
willing to reconsider. 
When it comes to punishing murder, both the Bible and the Ancient Greeks teach u~ 
that rich and poor shall be treated alike. The wealthy may not buy their way out. All stan 
equal before the law. There must be no class or race bias, but we must be discriminating· 
The ancients teach us to limit our confidence in these measures-to limit our faith that 
we can achieve proportional punishment through classifying crimes and attaching pun· 
ishments as deserved. 
Humbled and tentative as we declare and apply our death penalty, we must limit our 
rage. There is a time for anger, the Bible tells us- "your eye shall not pity him" -even 
"a time to hate and kill" (Ecclesiastes III:3) . But all emotion, especially anger, must be 
kept in check, warned Aristotle, preaching the Golden Mean throughout, and speciall~ 
praising "gentleness" - moderation in anger. "Being gentle means to be unruffled an 
not to be driven by emotion, but to be angry only under such circumstances and for as 
long a time as reason may bid:' Aristotle warned against "excessive" anger, "shown against 
the wrong persons, under the wrong circumstances, to an improper degree, too quicklY• 
and for an unduly long time . . . . Short tempered people are quick to be angered at the 
wrong people, under the wrong circumstances, and more than is right, but they get ~ve~ 
it quickly, and that is their best quality." But "bad tempered" people "cannot be reconcile 
without exacting their revenge" (Aristotle 1962b:1125b). 
''A gentle person is forgiving rather than vindictive" (Aristotle 1962b:1126a). But eve~ 
gentleness was not perfectly moderate. The "gentle" person was likely to "be more ~r~n~ 
to too little anger- "a kind of apathy or whatever else it may be," Aristotle critiCIZe · 
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"F 
fl ~r those who do not show anger at things that ought to arouse anger are regarded as 
00 
s. · · · Such people seem to have no feelings, not even for pain" (at 1126a). 
E "I~ is ~orally right to hate criminals;' declared Fitzjames Stephen, the great 19th century 
IInghsh Judge and historian, and emotive retributivists' patron saint (Stephen 1883:Vol. 
ab at 81-82). Capital murderers especially should be hated. Abolitionists sometimes seem 
S 
s.tractly ideological in rejecting all hatred or anger, except at the government or the 
0CiaJ C di . th . on tlons ey hold responsible for the brutal murder. Often they seem emotionally 
~ne-sided, reserving pity mostly for the condemned, and dislike for those who would 
b Xecute them. Reflexively they favor the underdog, regardless of why the condemned has 
g een rendered powerless to stop those who would execute him. They show their true 
~ntle spirit by emphasizing restoration and rehabilitation. In this respect, Plato was a 
ndred spirit. 
d .At the opposite extreme, carried away by an indiscriminate thirst for revenge, many 
Ge~h pe~alty proponents issue their inhumane battle cry, urging us to "Kill them all; let 
tn ° sort It out later." For Aristotle, rage was more dangerous than apathy-it was "much 
lS~re common for it is more human to seek revenge" (Aristotle 1962:1126a). For the last 
Years apathy and rage have been in closer balance. 
"W. w e must watch the errors which have the greatest attraction for us personally," Aristotle 
an~~ed (~ristotle 196~:~109b). The true retributivis~ who c.alls for punishn:ent~pain 
at d uffenng b~cause It IS deserved-especially despises sadists. In fac~, fe.elmg satisfied 
\'ict~served punishment, the retributivist hates sadists more deeply for subJecting vulnerable 
Irns to their selfish whims. 
w Frorn the Bible we learn that the victim's human dignity is paramount. From Aristotle 
b e explicitly learn that "righteous indignation" is the right attitude here- "the mean 
etween d . " h 'd "' c li f c envy an spite. T at old Hellenic virtue of at os-an mner tee ng o respect 
torwh d p . at eserves respect and revulsion from wrongdoing as such and not from fear of 
c Unishrnent" still animates us (Guthrie 1962:Vol. II, at 494). And when we do slay the 
e~n~ernned, even as we seek "solace in the face of suffering" (Hen berg 1990:6) by the ex-
Ution, we should feel pain mixed with satisfaction. 
Phifrorn the ancient Hebrews in their Torah and Talmud and the Ancient Gre~ks in their 
c ~Sophy and practice, our humility in identifying those who deserve to d1e calls for 
a 
0~hnuo~s study, and at trial, skilled champions on both sides. But in academic writing 
wn Pubhc discussion, we should model ourselves less on Protagoras, for whom debate 
0 as a. "verbal battle," and more on Socrates, who engaged in dialectic: Minds not bent n Win . h' "0 h I . th Oth ll!ng an argument antagonistically but commonly searc mg, ne e pmg e 
er that both may come nearer the truth" (Guthrie 1962:Vol. III, at 43; 449). 
e B~t we need more than a Socratic catalogue. We need a jurisprudence of informed 
tnot1on d . 1 . . tl . a! 1 . th , expresse m a anguage ncher than the stnc y ratiOn , emp oymg a grammar 
bo~ allow~ for reason and emotion, deep enough to cover law and equity, :md embrac~g 
flo consistency and fairness. Discrete legal categories can never be sufficient, for reality 
in~' as ~eraclitus insisted 2500 years ago. ''There are not ~o classes of murder but ~ 
d 
1 
te Variety, which shade off by degrees from the most atroctous to the most excusable, 
si~~ ared.the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment Report 60.years ago, implicitly 
tn~ With Heraclitus against Pythagoras, and with McGautha agamst Furman .. F~ctors 
lirni g death appropriate in particular cases "are too complex to be compressed Withm the 
th ts of a simpleformula" (§498). Where Jaw leaves off, equity enters. The Greeks believed 
1 9~t hurnans had an intuitive faculty to apprehend the true nature of a situation (Guthrie 2=VoL II, at 19). Moral intuition, although non-rational, remains indispensable. 
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For 3000 years, and especially these last 50, we have been building upon stable 
homicide law, refining categories of those who deserve to die, occasionally shedding 
former beliefs,. sometimes severing roots such as capital punishment for religious or 
morals offenses-progressively shrinking the class of death-eligibles. We draw up and 
apply our codes, approaching the substance and process with Socratic humility and 
great caution. 
"The Gods did not reveal to men all things in the beginning;' declared Xenophanes ~ 
century before Protagoras, "but in course of time, by searching, they find out better 
(Guthrie 1962:Vol. I, at 399). Must this search inevitably culminate in abolition? The 
ancient Greeks conceived of an asymptote-a curve that progressively approaches but 
never quite reaches another. Trusting that "over time the types of murder for which the 
death penalty may be imposed would become more narrowly defined and would be limited 
to those which are particularly serious or for which the death penalty is particularly ap-
propriate" (Zant v. Stephens 1983:877, quoting Justice White in Gregg v. Georgia 1976:222), 
we, too, might be moving toward a morally more refined death penalty where we execute 
virtually all and only those very, very few who truly deserve to die. 
We have not yet reached that point. Meanwhile, fallible human beings "made in the 
image of God;' we stumble along, erring but doing our best at justice. "Justice, justice, 
shall you pursue" -literally "chase after" (Deuteronomy, XVI:20) . We can all envision 
more perfect worlds. But in the end, said Plato, "We must take things as they are . .. and 
gather together to work out written codes, chasing to catch the tracks of the true 
constitution" (Plato 1957:301d-e), dragging behind us, however chipped away and crusted, 
our common core of deeply rooted values. 
We can only do our best chasing justice, striving to do better. We know there is "no 
perfect procedure;' nor perfectly defined set of substantive aggravators. "Who Jives or 
dies?" ultimately is an ethical question, whose correct answer necessarily must be partlY 
emotional. We cannot demand the same precision in ethics as in physics. Each sph~r~; 
each age has its own measure of progress and error, tuned to its developing technical SJ<W 
and moral sensibility. When it comes to the death penalty, some truth is eternal, some 
out of reach. Evolution is inevitable and progress possible. 
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